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Uncertainty in revenue for grain and oilseed operations located across Nebraska
exists due to commodity price volatility and yield variability. Several risk management
tools enable producers to deal with financial losses from revenue declines including crop
insurance, marketing strategies, and government farm programs. Producers may need to
combine multiple tools for an effective risk management strategy, but research lacks on
integrating these tools currently available to producers across the state. Actions amongst
individuals actively engaged in the industry show their plans to deal with revenue
declines may lead to less than optimal strategies.
Stochastic simulation utilizing eight representative farms across Nebraska allows
for the analysis of risk management strategies. Attributes of these farms reflect the
average size, productivity, and variability, expressed by operations across the eight
National Agricultural Statistical Districts of the state. Also, the simulation of national,
state, district, and county yields or prices are generated for the necessary parameters in
the evaluation of various programs or products.
Conclusion drawn from these simulations indicate the optimal risk management
strategy for a region of Nebraska, given a set of feasible prices and base 2011 yield and

price parameters. Current program participation and product utilization rates indicate
strategies employed by the majority of producers in the state do not sway far from these
simulated outcomes. Participating in higher levels of revenue protection crop insurance,
direct and counter-cyclical government programs, and using a short futures hedge when
marketing grain provided the greatest level of revenue protection subject to a producer’s
risk preference. Findings may change substantially dependent upon different price, yield,
or guarantee levels.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Nebraska’s geography, topography, soils and climate influence the scope and
variety of cropping systems. Due to climatic variability and volatile commodity markets,
farm-level crop revenue varies with these conditions. An assortment of revenue and price
safety nets may reduce financial losses for those participating in federal farm programs.
In addition, producers may choose from multiple crop insurance and marketing strategies
to help manage risk. The complexity of these risk management alternatives often leave
producers overwhelmed and may lead to less-than optimal decision making.
1.1 Motivation
As a leader in grain and oilseed production, Nebraska farm operations raised
approximately 1.5 billion bushels of corn, 267 million bushels of soybeans, and 64
million bushels of winter wheat in 2010 (Nebraska Department of Agriculture, 2010).
Farmers across Nebraska contribute a substantial share of commodity supplies feeding
national demand for livestock feeds, renewable energy, exports, and other uses. While
these multiple demands allow for numerous avenues to market grain and oilseed
commodities, individual producers still face sizeable risk in crop revenue during the
production process.
In each production cycle, crop producers raising grains and oilseeds make large
monetary investments to raise commodities with an uncertain return. Depending upon an
operation’s financial situation, capital may be constrained for a period exceeding 12 to 18
months. Expenses vary depending upon the production techniques and location in
Nebraska, with crop revenue being the product of both yield and price. The types of
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revenue losses may be either classified as shallow or deep on which the farm specific
(idiosyncratic) and large scale (systemic) losses influence crop revenue (Zulauf, 2011).
These two factors implicitly feed into a producer’s decision making based upon their risk
tolerance and financial condition.
Environmental factors unique to the farm lead to idiosyncratic risk, whereas
regional weather events such as drought or national price declines contribute to systemic
risk. These factors play a role in the performance of various programs or products
designed to reduce the effects of losses in yield or price. Historically farm-level yield
shocks deviate randomly from trend projections. Commodity price volatility increased in
recent years along with record high crop prices. For example, corn prices prior to 2006
averaged around $2.00 per bushel with a deviation of $0.50. With the advent of a nearly
two- to three-fold increase in values, the volatility of prices have followed suit. Similar
trends can be observed in both the soybean and wheat markets (Hailu & Weersink, 2011).
To deal with these revenue risks, grain producers have a variety of price- and/or
revenue-based programs available. Using these programs or products simultaneously is a
challenge due to the complexity and wide variation of productivity factors on individual
farms. Relevant government programs include the Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE) Program, the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment (DCP) Program, the
Marketing Loan (ML) Program, and the Supplemental Revenue Assistance (SURE)
Program. Federally-subsidized crop insurance products include Yield Protection (YP),
Revenue Protection (RP), and Revenue Protection with a Harvest Price Exclusion
(RP-HPE). Marketing strategies are also important to the discussion including hedging
with futures, options, or cash-market alternatives.
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Lubben and Novak (2010) classified the degree by which these programs or
products interact to guard against adverse price, revenue, or production movements and
the correlating levels of farm, area, or national scope. Intricacies and correlations
between programs or products generates the necessary motivation for further evaluation
to gain an understanding the effects these tools have on reducing negative variability of
crop revenue and ultimately farm revenue generated from commodity sales. Analyzing
the influence of production and climatic characteristics across Nebraska and how these
elements interact will also further demonstrate the value of different strategies used
across the state.
Zulauf (2011) defines even further the level of idiosyncratic and systemic risk
protection available under each program or product. From these references, a feasible set
of alternatives involving government programs, crop insurance and marketing strategies
may be drawn. Current research shows individual producer decision makers may focus
on products or programs with maximum payout anticipations instead of selecting
combinations achieving optimal risk reduction (Lubben & Novak, 2010). Analyzing the
feasible set of alternatives using DCP versus ACRE will explore payouts under each
strategy.
Every crop producer located in the state of Nebraska has different financial,
production, and risk tolerance or aversion characteristics. Even in scenarios where an
individual’s balance sheet has a high level of equity, volatile price and yield movements
put financial resources at substantial risk. Beginning or aggressively expanding
producers with limited resources and objectives may be compromised when losses occur.
The level of risk may vary across enterprises, but the overall goal remains maximizing
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net crop revenue subject to risk. To accomplish this goal, each producer should develop
a risk management strategy appropriate to his or her needs.
1.2 Objectives
The following research objectives focus on farm-level decision making relative to
risk management programs and marketing strategies available to Nebraska crop
producers. Whether from farm-specific variation in yield or national price declines,
losses in revenue may be due to elements beyond an individual’s control. Developing a
strategy to deal with these challenges allows a producer to cope with potential revenue
losses. Due to the complexity of the interaction among alternatives, producers’
perception regarding these strategies may lead to less-than-optimal outcomes.
Understanding how the portfolio of risk management programs and marketing strategies
interact allows research to broaden the application by producers across different regions
of the state.
The objective of this research includes:
1) Create a set of eight representative crop farms that display the average size,
scale, and productivity factors associated with United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service-Agricultural
Statistical Districts (NASS-ASDs). From these operations, a stochastic
simulation will be used to produce yield and price distributions, drawing upon
historical data and implied variations of individual producers.
2) Build a comprehensive set of revenue schedules to evaluate the effects of
government programs ACRE, DCP, and ML; crop insurance products YP, RP,
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and RP-HPE; and marketing tools including the use of hedging and cash
market alternatives.
3) Using the programs or products defined in the revenue schedules, arrange a
set of risk management tools in order to identify the results of various
combinations of revenue protection regimes.
4) Simulate and summarize results to determine the effect of various strategies
on farm-level crop revenue across different regions of the state showing
potential variability of the regions.
These simulation results will build on other relevant studies. Other research has
found, that optimal risk reduction strategy vary across different crops and regions
(Woodward, Sherrick, & Schnitkey, 2010). The simulation results will demonstrate the
effects environmental and climatic features have on crop revenue expectations and the
optimum risk management strategy within a particular region of Nebraska. These results
will help producers to make improved risk management decisions relative to their farm
and location. Each producer faces different financial conditions and yield variability.
Having a representative farm for each region allows producers to compare their farm
against an operation reflecting the average attributes of an area.
1.3 Organization
The literature review in Chapter 2 discusses tools relevant to the farm including
programs, policies, and marketing strategies which when integrated, create a producer’s
risk management portfolio. Along with understanding the principles of these policies, the
review will consider previous simulation work as a foundation to develop a crop revenue
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model for Nebraska. As previous research has primarily focused on individual
components of the risk management portfolio, combining these tools and focusing
research efforts to sites specific to Nebraska combines the assumptions necessary to
analyze different strategies across the state.
Based upon the literature review, Chapter 3 discusses the necessary procedures
and methods to reach the research objectives. Stochastic simulation of yield and price
distributions provides the underlying process to generate farm-level crop revenue
distributions. Summarized results from individual farm simulations act as the basis for
discussion in Chapter 4. Previously outlined risk management scenarios and the overall
effects of a particular strategy had on a particular farm’s net crop revenue are
summarized in the results section. The analysis provides insight on individual
representative farms, but also across different regions of Nebraska.
These implications on farms and across districts are highlighted in Chapter 5.
Insights from the results guide recommendations for future producer decisions, policy
formation, and research. This analysis may serve as a basis for the next round of Farm
Bill discussions. Budgetary issues may force producers to reconsider risk management
tool integration given reduced program options or coverage levels.

7

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Revenue risk in crop operations comes from price volatility and yield variability
caused by market and environmental factors. Nebraska crop producers face challenges
when selecting the proper risk management strategy. Multiple options increase the
complexity of selecting the right combination of tools. Previous research has focused on
individual components of a producer’s risk management portfolio, such as government
programs, crop insurance products, or marketing tools. A study of effective risk
management strategies needs to consider all the components available to producers in
Nebraska while drawing from results of other relevant studies.
2.1 Review of Risk Management Alternatives
Tools to manage crop revenue risk are regulated and overseen by different
authorities. The Federal Government administers federal farm programs and supports the
delivery of crop insurance products through private insurers. Marketing strategies may
be carried out on publicly regulated exchanges or through private market transactions.
All together these tools help producers protect against losses in yield, price, or revenue.
In periods of dynamic yield or price shifts the performance of different alternative
combinations may vary depending upon the focus of the protection.
The 2008 Farm Bill reauthorized federal farm programs, including price-based
programs such as the DCP and ML program along with new revenue base safety nets
ACRE and SURE (USDA Economic Research Service, 2008). ACRE protects actual
revenue on a farm based on actual production, while DCP provides income support tied
to price paid on historical base acres and program yields. The ML program or Loan
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Deficiency Payments (LDPs) effectively provide a minimum price to producers for all
eligible crops raised in the United States. The DCP program includes fixed guaranteed
Direct Payments (DPs) decoupled from production and Counter-Cyclical Payments
(CCPs) triggered by prices dropping below a specified target price (USDA Farm Service
Agency, 2008). The revenue safety net in the ACRE program replaces the CCPs. When
producers choose to participate in the ACRE program, the producers opt out of CCPs for
the revenue safety net and reduce DPs by 20% and ML rates by 30% (USDA Farm
Service Agency, 2009). SURE serves as the first legislative language to implement a
permanent disaster program, but was authorized only through September 31, 2011
(USDA Farm Service Agency, 2011). All of these programs base revenue guarantees or
price protection off of the national marketing year average (MYA) price.
Crop insurance products administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency
(RMA) include YP, RP, and RP-HPE. A producer’s Actual Production History (APH)
serves as the benchmark for these insurance products. YP offers financial payment to
producers when an operation’s actual yield falls below the guarantee. RP and RP-HPE
base similar support on a farm’s revenue guarantee. Both of the revenue products
function in a similar manner by which payments are made when actual revenue drops
below the predefined protection level. Under RP the revenue guarantee is calculated off
the higher of the planting-time or harvest-time average futures price, while RP-HPE
calculates the guarantee only on the planting-time average futures price (USDA Risk
Management Agency, 2011a).
Finally, the third set of tools available to stabilize crop revenue come from
marketing tools including futures, options, and cash contracts traded either on publically
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regulated exchanges or transacted in private markets. A multitude of marketing options
exist to offset price declines and stabilize revenue. In the most basic form, selling futures
contracts or buying put options serve as the means to predefine a sale price of growing or
harvested crops in the future (CME Group, 2011). Cash contracts predefine a
commodities’ price in the future along with the delivery location. Cash marketing of
crops involves directly selling the commodity at harvest-time.
All of these alternatives are relevant to the risk management discussion. Each act
uniquely against revenue declines. Yield and price remain the core component of
revenue. Interactions amongst the various options against yield or price declines create
different levels of protection and expected payouts. Alternative marketing strategies only
protect against price declines, whereas other crop revenue stabilization options may
protect against yield declines as well.
2.2 Overlap and Participation Rates
Lubben and Novak (2010) present an overview of the various safety nets and
price support options relevant to producers in Nebraska. In their analysis these options
are either classified as affecting the farm, area, or national levels of risk along with the
scope of protection guarding against price, revenue, or production declines. In Figure
2.1, adapted and revised from Lubben and Novak, updates to the decision aid schematic
show the various options available to producers during the 2011 production year and how
the tools overlap or integrate to form the farm income crop revenue safety net.
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Figure 2.1 The Farm Income Safety Net
In additional to the tools previously reviewed, Figure 2.1 notes the Adjusted
Gross Revenue (AGR), Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement (CAT), Group Risk
Plan (GRP), Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP), Group Risk Income ProtectionHarvest Revenue Option (GRIP/H), and Pasture, Range, and Forage (PRF) insurance
options offered by RMA, as well as hedging. Although producers have these alternatives
availiable, GRP, GRIP, and GRIP/H offer support upon county production and CAT
serves as a minimal insurance product paying in the event of severe damages. The CAT,
GRP, GRIP, and GRIP/H tools are not considered in this analysis. AGR and PRF remain
in pilot stages for select qualifying operations (USDA Risk Management Agency,
2011a). Types of hedging activities may vary across farms, but an active marketing plan
should incorportate a sales strategy as part of the risk management tool portfolio.
Crop insurance participation rates in Nebraska shows RP, RP-HPE, and YP
account for about 99% of all policies written during 2011. Aggregating insured corn,
soybean, and wheat acreages indicates RP is prefered for the vast majority of units at
84.5%, YP second at 11.6%, and RP-HPE third at 3.9% (USDA Risk Management
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Agency, 2011b). Simlar analysis may be drawn about USDA Farm Service Agency
(FSA) programs denoted in Figure 2.1. CCP participation during the 2010 production
year in Nebraska represents 74.2% of total farm acres enrolled versus only 25.8% for
ACRE (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2011). These statistics highlight the underlying
assumptions producers make regarding the performance and expected level of protection
when selecting government programs and crop insurance products.
Zulauf (2011) expands further on the elements of a farm income safety net when
describing the interactions between government programs and private insurance products.
By design, these tools create overlap, but crop insurance focuses on farm-specific
idiosyncratic hazards, whereas government programs cover widespread systemic losses.
Declines in crop revenue may be attributed to a loss that falls in either category. A
comprehensive analysis of farm-level crop revenue must include a study of the tools and
strategies producers are currently using to cover these potential revenue losses.
2.3 Safety Net Decisions
Crop producers face a multitude of potential farm program, crop insurance, and
marketing combinations when devising a risk management strategy. Pennings,
Isengildina-Massa, Irwin, Garcia, and Good (2008) note potential combinations of risk
management tools to consider in the decision making process increase at a factorial rate
with each additional instrument, but underlying factors influence the process. Through
analyzing the 2001 Agricultural and Resource Management Surveys (ARMS), Uematsu
and Mishra (2010) found operator characteristics such as age, being raised on a farm, offfarm labor, total acres, and capital costs all had a positive influence on the adoption of
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risk management tools. Participation rates with crop insurance products and government
programs were found to increase with operation size.
Velandia, Rejesus, Knight, and Sherrick (2009) found similar results utilizing a
2001 survey of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa corn and soybean farmers about operator
characteristics and utilization of different strategies. A second finding shows producers
consider how net return distributions interact with various revenue stabilization
instruments. Connections between revenue stabilization strategies and idiosyncratic and
systemic risk serve as the basis for a producer’s use of the tools. Operator characteristics
also guide preferences and selection of different risk management tools.
Policy discussions during the 2008 Farm Bill formation period created the ACRE
program in addition to the CCP and DP previously available. Cooper (2009) discussed
how a revenue-based program was initially projected to be more effective than
previously-established price-based income support and ad hoc disaster programs for a
producer’s bottom line. Although moving towards greater protection against revenue
declines, ACRE does not serve as a direct substitute for crop insurance or disaster
programs. ACRE and CCP focus on state revenue or national price risk coming from
aggregated systemic risk. Crop insurance or disaster programs focus on the farm-level
production risk advancing from idiosyncratic risk (Shields, Monke, & Schnepf, 2010).
While keeping these risk attributes in mind, Woolverton and Young (2009)
outlined ACRE enrollment questions which producers must evaluate when decidng to
participate. Primary factors to consider include price and yield expectations, state versus
farm-level yield correlation, cash flow changes with a reduction in rates with the DPs or
LDPs, and risk preferences. Coble, Dismukes, and Thomas (2007) elaborated on the
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issue of farm-level correlations with state yields even further. Strong correlation with
individual farm yields and state averages may generate large program payments. Low
correlations between farm and state crop revenue can lead to poor program performance.
Campiche and Harris (2010) cited previous sources on overlap between potential
payments from revenue protection under ACRE and crop insurance, but the true risk
distributions show overlap limited to 5% or less. Taking this factor into account,
producers may gain the greatest protection by selecting both ACRE and crop revenue
insurance. Revenue guarantees with ACRE reflect price and yield levels closer to actual
production, whereas DCP price supports coupled with historical bases may not reflect
current cropping patterns and productivity levels. Given these fundamental differences in
ACRE and DCP, low particiation rates indicate producers in Nebraska must expect
potential ACRE payouts to be less than the declines in DPs. Discrepanicies between
producer actions and literature on decision making suggest areas for further inquiry.
Participation in different hedging activities remains correlated with purchases of
crop insurance products (Velandia et al., 2009). Selection of different tools from the
portfolio of programs or products shows these activites do not have mutually-exclusive
properties. Operator characteristics coupled with expectations about currently-available
tools serve as the basis to guide risk decisions. The production aspects of producers
across Nebraska may lead to one strategy being preferable for a region, but not
neccesarily across the entire state. These questions may be answered through the
stochastic simulation modeling of yields and prices.
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2.4 Simulation Models
Simulation and forecast modeling relevant to portfolio analysis of risk
management tools has historically focused on either a sector-level analysis or
representative-farm comparison. This type of research serves as the basis for identifying
a modeling and analysis procedure relevant to farm-level decisions in Nebraska.
Building upon previous simulation modeling and incorporating the scope and variability
of Nebraska farms leads to analysis relevant to the diversity of cropping patterns across
the state.
At a sector level, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI)
(2011) provides annual agricultural baseline projections and policy analysis. However,
estimates provided by the FAPRI model are aggregated and may not reflect the outcomes
relevant for farm-level decision making. Projected values do provide value in national
policy debates and overall judgment of expected performance of major sectors
composing the agricultural industry. Forecast values serve as a baseline in farm-level
simulation modeling done at Texas A&M University (Richardson, Outlaw, Knapek,
Raulston, Herbst, Anderson, & Klose, 2011).
In another sectoral analysis, Coble and Dismukes (2008) outlined potential
average payouts from integrating government programs and crop insurance across
eligible acres across the United States. Dismukes, Arriola, and Coble (2010) further
evaluated potential ACRE payouts across the United States and identified average
variability rates of yields pertinent to the program’s revenue triggers. Their results also
reaffirmed the importance of correlation between farm and state-level yields related to the
likelihood of potential ACRE payouts. Zulauf and Orden (2010) took a historical
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perspective in evaluating national ACRE program costs in lieu of CCPs and a reduction
in DPs during the 1996 to 2008 period and forecasts for 2008 to 2012. These findings
show ACRE would have reduced government expenditures during the historical period,
but would have increased them during the forecast.
Projections from the FAPRI model serve as parameters for farm-level modeling
taking place at the Agriculture and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M
University. The models used by AFPC evaluate different risk alternatives for
approximately 98 representative crop, livestock, and dairy farms strategically located
across the United States to forecast the financial health of these operations under
alternative policies and production scenarios. Nebraska’s contribution to the AFPC
project are two representative grain farms located in the south central portion of the state
measuring 2,400 and 4,300 acres in size (Richardson et al., 2011). These models, while
generally representative, lack the detail for wide application across the state.
Based off the north-central Iowa, northern Arkansas, and southern Texas
representative farms in the AFPC annual model, Knapek, Richardson, Outlaw, and
Raulston (2011) evaluated eight different simulation scenarios involving various
government and crop insurance combinations. This study used the coefficient of
variation to measure the effects of the various combinations on net farm revenue.
Findings of interest to Nebraska grain and oilseed producers indicated crop insurance
coupled with the available government programs provides the lowest coefficient of
variation versus any single option alone. Raulston, Richardson, Outlaw, and Knapek,
(2011) also uses a set of AFPC representative farms to evaluate the performance of
whole-farm revenue insurance in place of available government programs.
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Woodard, et al. (2010) expand upon previous crop insurance studies by
integrating a multi-crop framework in the simulation analysis of crop insurance products
relevant to producers in Illinois. Yield distributions utilized in their investigation came
from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) record keeping system
historical data series. This study indicates farm-level insurance outperforms the county
product equivalent due to a producer’s yields having lower correlations with the larger
aggregated distributions. Also, the evaluation of a single-crop model versus a multi-crop
framework significantly influences results on expected revenue distributions.
Drawing upon the FBFM and Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA)
yield series, Zulauf, Schnitkey, and Langemeier (2010) modeled a more extensive
evaluation by incorporating the interactions between ACRE, SURE, and RP. Results
show that 75% RP has a larger impact for Kansas farms, whereas ACRE provides greater
protection for Illinois farms. These findings highlight the influence that geographical and
climatic patterns have on the performance of various risk management tools.
With the diversity in size, numbers, and location of farms throughout Nebraska,
previous studies and research are not sufficient upon which to base decisions for all
producers in the state. Many of the previous research studies highlight findings on
selected tools. A theme common amongst previous studies and many forecasting
methods is to use information from the past such as variability to predict possible future
yield and price distributions. Clearly, the literature indicates that understanding
interactions among the various programs, products, or marketing strategies provides the
most insight on how the optimal risk management strategy might be given different
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regions of the state. Previous models and procedures serve as a basis to develop a system
to evaluate risk management decisions involving the portfolio of options available.
2.5 Summary of Literature Reviewed
Nebraska crop producers face risk in the form of uncertainty in prices and yields.
Government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing strategies create the
portfolio of risk management tools producers have at their disposal. By design, these
instruments create overlap in protection against yield, price, or revenue declines.
Expectations about the performance of these tools affect the decision producers make
when implementing risk management strategies.
Previous research focuses at an aggregate level to evaluate policy costs as well as
the overall health of the agricultural sector in the United States. Also, these models have
only a few farms that are not fully representative of Nebraska agriculture. As the optimal
risk management strategy varies depending upon a producer’s size and location, more
specific modeling is needed. Referencing literature cited above, farm-level risk
management modeling with application for Nebraska crop producers is developed in the
next chapter to focus on evaluating alternative strategies utilizing the portfolio of risk
management tools across different regions of the state.
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CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS
Stochastic simulation modeling serves as the foundation for assessing scenarios
when implementing different risk management strategies. The diversity in scale,
cropping patterns, and production methods across Nebraska creates challenges when
constructing representative farms for regions across the state. Forming a set of
representative farms depicting typical characteristics and attributes allows for the
assessment of different levels of risk exposure and management decisions on crop
revenue. Cropping patterns, yield expectations, and actual variability differ with climatic
patterns and soil types. Parameters expressing the average acreage, crop mix, and
productivity factors must be representative of the farms used in the following analysis to
establish an appropriate simulation.
3.1 Representative Model of Nebraska Crop Production
To estimate program parameters relevant to the different Nebraska crop
production areas, a set of commodity yields and prices need to be modeled for the
simulation of crop revenue, government programs, crop insurance products, and
marketing strategies. The relevant set of parameters includes yields at the national, state,
district, county, and farm level along with relevant prices. While national and state yield
distributions are relevant across Nebraska, selecting the appropriate districts, counties,
and farm-level locations needs further evaluation. Also, price ranges for cash sales,
government programs, and crop insurance products all require appropriate basis
adjustments to the base simulation price.
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3.1.1 Geographical Regions
The geography of Nebraska varies across the state causing production systems
and cropping patterns to differ due to these properties. These physical features influence
cropping patterns and expected trend yields seen throughout the state. Irrigation remains
a strong feature for many operations because of available water sources. Irrigated crops
have higher expected yield projections and less variability than dryland grain and oilseed
crops. Crops not receiving additional moisture from irrigation and solely relying on
precipitation for water will be referenced as dryland crops. Accurately assessing the
productivity and cropping acreages must take into account these unique attributes.

Figure 3.1 Nebraska National Agriculture Statistics Service-Agricultural Statistical
Districts (NASS-ASDs) and Representative County Simulation Sites
The NASS-ASDs subdivide Nebraska’s 93 counties into eight regions. Figure 3.1
displays the eight NASS-ASDs for Nebraska. Consistent with NASS’s definitions the
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districts are named as well as numbered. Counties within each district share similar
production characteristics and yield expectations. Also in Figure 3.1, one county per
district has been outlined as a representative county within the district. The districts and
their representative counties include: Northwest 10 – Morrill, North 20 – Holt, Northeast
30 – Wayne, Central 50 - Sherman, East 60 – Butler, Southwest 70 – Hayes, South 80 –
Kearney, and Southeast 90 – Saline. These counties represent the typical attributes of a
district’s productivity and cropping patterns. Specifying districts and counties showing
representative attributes of Nebraska crop production allows for parameter estimation of
crop yields from historical NASS records.
3.1.2 Commodity Prices
Crop revenue, government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing
strategies under evaluation require modeling of different prices. At the most basic level,
crop revenue equals the yield times the cash selling price per bushel at harvest for a
particular commodity. Government programs including ACRE and CCP base safety nets
off the national MYA price. The ML safety net is calculated from adjusted national price
and national average loan rates. Crop insurance products such as YP, RP, and RP-HPE
base indemnities either off the average of planting-time or harvest-time price for a
particular commodity futures contract. Finally, forward contracting, hedging, options, or
marketing strategies involving a combination of these tools also use futures prices
corresponding to a particular commodity futures contract.
Price parameter specification limits the complexity of modeling while capturing
the appropriate relationships. The difference between the planting-time and harvest-time
average futures prices is used as a proxy to simulate price variability. Daily futures price
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series from commodity exchanges are maintained by the Commodity Research Bureau
(CRB) (Commodity Research Bureau, 2011). Based upon these historical records annual
deviations from the planting-time price to the harvest-time price were determined to serve
as the stochastic price elements.
The simulated harvest-time futures price provides the basis from which other
price parameters are derived. Historical MYA prices reported by NASS allowed for
generating a 10-year average fixed basis between harvest-time futures prices and MYA
prices (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2011). MYA prices recorded by
NASS relevant to the model include one each at the national and state level. Government
programs that rely on a national MYA price utilize the simulated futures price plus the
national MYA basis, whereas the farm-level revenue calculations use the harvest-time
futures plus the state MYA basis to determine a cash price.
3.1.3 Crop Acres and Yields
Crop acres and yields necessary for evaluating effects of risk management tools
include national, state, district, county, and representative farm yields. Also, at the farm
level, crop acreage and mix reflecting the average characteristics of a farm operating in
each NASS-ASD need to be developed. To derive these characteristics, a variety of data
sets contain the necessary elements to project crop mix or yields, variability, and farm
size. Historical variations from expectations serve as the basis for determining deviations
from trend yields.
NASS maintains annual yield and harvested acreage data for the national, state,
district, and county levels (USDA National Agricultural Statistical Service, 2011). In
some regions or counties, data was limited due to confidentiality issues. Using available
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county-level acreage and yield values, the irrigation and dryland cropping practices for
all major crops in Nebraska can be aggregated to the district level. These values show
distinct cropping patterns across major regions of Nebraska. Wheat production is
concentrated in the western part of the state, whereas soybean acres are concentrated in
the eastern area. Irrigation is a practice factor throughout the state.
Annual yield data series observed from the NASS database including the nation,
state, districts, and counties serve as the foundation for stochastic simulation values.
Trend yields are estimated at the national, state, and district level leaving the deviations
from trend as a measure of crop variability in a specific area. County yields were
regressed directly off of district yields according to crop and practice. Also, to estimate
farm-level yields, an implied volatility procedure utilizing RMA crop insurance product
quotes allowed for the expansion of county yields to the farm level to express
idiosyncratic risk elements. Yields selected for simulation were chosen based upon the
percentage of overall crops comprising harvested cropland acres for a particular area.
Farm-level revenue modeling requires crop yields and acreages representative of
operations in a given district or county. To gain a broader perspective on the size and
scale of Nebraska farm operations, the 2007 Census of Agriculture conducted by USDA
NASS provides cropland acres and total number of operators sorted according to gross
farm income ranges (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009). Operations
in Nebraska with gross farm income above $100,000 per year account for the greatest
percentage of overall commodity production. Therefore, using acres and farm numbers
from these operations provides a set of representative farms that reflect typical
commodity production in Nebraska. Based upon operations in the 2007 Census of
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Agriculture meeting the income parameters, the total cropland acres and producers at the
district level were aggregated from the county data. Dividing these two figures provides
the average number of cropland acres per representative site in each district.
From the aggregated harvested acres data at the county level, these values were
weighted at the district level to determine the percent of each major crop and practices for
the respective region. These values were multiplied by the average number of cropland
acres for each representative farm to create the acreage distributions in Table 3.1. The
farms in each column are named according to the geographic regions which these farms
represent. Crops are excluded from a representative farm if they are not a significant
part of the district’s crop mix.
Table 3.1 Representative Farm Sites with Cropland Acres, Expected Yields, and
Actual Production History (APH)
Cropland Acres
Corn Irrigated
Corn Dryland
Soybeans Irrigated
Soybeans Dryland
Winter Wheat
Total
Expected Yields
2011 (bu./acre)
Corn Irrigated
Corn Dryland
Soybeans Irrigated
Soybeans Dryland
Winter Wheat
Actual Production History
2001-2010 (bu./acre)
Corn Irrigated
Corn Dryland
Soybeans Irrigated
Soybeans Dryland
Winter Wheat

District 10 District 20 District 30 District 50 District 60 District 70 District 80 District 90
Farm
Farm
Farm
Farm
Farm
Farm
Farm
Farm
372.9
891.0
230.1
794.7
318.9
702.6
558.6
280.4
157.2
380.2
126.8
273.4
282.6
171.5
377.7
329.1
147.7
206.0
173.7
96.9
303.7
173.8
303.9
259.8
377.5
874.4
522.3
167.0
1247.3
1377.3
1062.0
1127.5
1025.8
1604.3
1200.8
1209.3

166.0
42.0

188.1
76.5
58.0
-

205.7
155.5
56.0
47.5
-

194.9
94.0
60.0
-

190.5
129.9
60.0
42.7
-

193.4
71.1
58.6
41.0

204.6
112.5
63.0
48.1

195.8
111.3
58.7
39.3
-

156.9
35.4

175.0
71.5
51.6
-

185.4
131.9
53.3
42.1
-

181.8
81.4
55.9
-

183.2
123.4
56.6
42.1
-

183.0
68.4
55.6
43.0

193.0
89.2
59.0
46.7

186.2
111.5
56.6
38.7
-

Table 3.1 also displays expected farm-level trend yields in 2011 and APH yields
based upon the 2001-2010 time period. Using the county level yields and adding in a
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stochastic, idiosyncratic risk element creates the farm-level yields. Implied yield
volatility from crop insurance premiums was used to generate the stochastic element
necessary to derive yield variability representative to those crops being modeled at the
farm level. Also, crops modeled at the district and county level were appropriately
correlated with those represented at the farm level. District and county yields are
modeled only for those crops and practices that are included at the representative farm
level.
Other acreage and yield parameters relevant to the farm level for analysis of risk
management tools relate to government programs. ACRE, CCP, and DP require base
acre and yield parameters. For this analysis, total base acres are assumed to equal total
cropland acres for each of the representative farms. The ACRE Olympic average yield
for a particular farm equals the average of the APH yields over the past five years with
high and low values dropped from the tabulations. Planted acres for the ACRE program
reflect those crops actually being raised for the current production year, whereas those for
DP and CCP reflect those established by historical values for previous production years
specified by a particular farm bill program. Also program yields reflect those of
historical records available from a weighted data set maintained by USDA-FSA (USDA
Farm Service Agency, 2006).
Depicting the scale, productivity, and crop mix of farms across Nebraska remains
a challenge due to the sheer number of operations. The eight representative farms across
the state aim to accurately reflect the typical crop revenue attributes for major
geographical regions. Equally important to the model is the positive and negative
interactions among yield and price variables. Observing correlations between these
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relationships allows for idiosyncratic and systemic relationships to flow throughout the
simulation.
3.2 Correlated Model
Previously cited literature outlines the purpose of correlations between yield and
price distributions in stochastic simulations. Depending upon the interactions of price
with various levels of yield aggregation, performance of risk management tools may
vary. At the base of the modeling procedure, a moving linear trend was fitted to the yield
data to determine deviations from projections. Price deviations were calculated as the
deviation in the average futures prices between planting time and harvest time. The raw
deviations were non-stationary and were detrended to account for biases resulting from
trend due to technological and productivity gains over time. Finally, a multi-step
procedure was used to determine and model the directionality of correlations between
yield and price parameters to allow for their full expression between simulation variables.
3.2.1 Yield and Price Deviations
Over time, yield and price parameters either positively or negatively deviated
from expectations. These variations account for systemic and idiosyncratic shocks
expressed across various production levels. As the level of yield aggregation decreases,
the deviations from trend increase due to the effects of decreasing averaging over smaller
land areas. These historical deviations serve as the source of variability in the simulation
model. Stochastic deviations are assumed to have normalized distributions based upon
preliminary analysis failing to reject the null hypothesis. Yield deviations were
calculated for all crops and practices and evaluated at the national, state, and district
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levels, whereas the county and farm-level yields were regressed directly from higherlevel yields. Table 3.2 shows the 42 calculated yield deviations along with the
corresponding regions, cropping practices, and values.
For every yield deviation, a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) moving trend
regression were fitted for each 30 years of data. For example, the 1990 deviation for
irrigated corn in District 30 represents a forecast of the derivation from the linear trend
fitted to the actual data between 1960 and 1989. The following year’s calculation, 1991,
bases the deviation off the OLS refitted to 1961 to1990. This process is repeated
annually so that readjustments of the linear trend were included. The method accounts
for structural changes, such as increases in productivity to happen over time. Deviations
for price represent the difference between the planting-time and harvest-time average
futures price to determine expected fall harvest price. Subject to a basis difference, the
stochastic futures deviations create the price values for all revenues, programs, and
products evaluated.
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Table 3.2 National, State, and District Yield Variable Deviations
Variable
crnfutprdv
soyfutprdv
hrwwhtfutprdv

Region
United States
United States
United States

uscrntotylddv
ussoytotylddv
uswhttotylddv
necrnirrylddv
necrndryylddv
nesoyirrylddv
nesoydryylddv
newhttotylddv
D10crnirrylddv
D20crnirrylddv
D30crnirrylddv
D50crnirrylddv
D60crnirrylddv
D70crnirrylddv
D80crnirrylddv
D90crnirrylddv
D20crndryylddv
D30crndryylddv
D50crndryylddv
D60crndryylddv
D70crndryylddv
D80crndryylddv
D90crndryylddv
D20soyirrylddv
D30soyirrylddv
D50soyirrylddv
D60soyirrylddv
D70soyirrylddv
D80soyirrylddv
D90soyirrylddv
D30soydryylddv
D60soydryylddv
D90soydryylddv
D10whttotylddv
D70whttotylddv
D80whttotylddv

United States
United States
United States
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
District 10
District 20
District 30
District 50
District 60
District 70
District 80
District 90
District 20
District 30
District 50
District 60
District 70
District 80
District 90
District 20
District 30
District 50
District 60
District 70
District 80
District 90
District 30
District 60
District 90
District 10
District 70
District 80

1

1

Crop Practice Value
corn futures prices
soybeans futures prices
hard red futures price
winter wheat
corn
total yield
soybean
total yield
wheat
total yield
corn irrigated yield
corn
total yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean
dry yield
wheat
total yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn irrigated yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
corn
dry yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean irrigated yield
soybean
dry yield
soybean
dry yield
soybean
dry yield
wheat
total yield
wheat
total yield
wheat
total yield

Variability
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation
deviation

Total cropping practices include all irrigated and dryland production and
acreage for a particular region.
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3.2.2 Detrending Deviations
To account for changes occurring in corn, soybean, and wheat yields, including
deviations due to technological and productivity advancements, an OLS regression was
used to detrend deviations of actual production from the linear projections. To be
consistent, all deviations from the linear projections were detrended for each level of
yield and price. With the relatively small sample size of deviations from the linear
projections, the OLS proved to be the most effective method to handle the stationarity
issue. Once the deviations from the linear trend projections were detrended, the
following correlation procedure was utilized to allow for relationships to carry through at
every price and yield levels.
3.2.3 Correlation Procedure
Lubben and Jansen (2010) have shown that correlation relationships involving
MYA prices along with national, state, district, and county crop yields in Nebraska.
These values show yields and prices at various levels have statistically significant
relationships. Depending upon the particular variable, programs or products under
evaluation may preform differently depending upon the strength of yield and price
correlations to the critical program value. Correlations must be maintained between the
96 stochastic yield and price variables. Every draw of the simulation needs to relay the
correlative effects of yields and price elements on other variables. To achieve this goal,
an approach using a base correlation matrix coupled with sorted Directed Acyclic Graphs
(DAGs) allows for observation of the respective relationships. This procedure illustrates
the relationships amongst variables at a given level of statistical significance.
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First in the model, a correlation matrix simultaneously draws the relationship
between 12 national and state time-adjusted yield parameters along with the respective
price. These become the base values of the model. Given the software used, increasing
the number of relationships beyond these 12 parameters causes singularity and nonconvergence in the correlation matrix. Relationships between lower aggregation levels
such as district, county, and farm level yields still need to be calculated with respect to
the underlying correlations. A multi-step procedure involving TETRAD IV, yield
regressions, and crop insurance yield calibrations allows for the interactions to carry
through at the lower aggregation levels.
The various relationships involving the state and district time-adjusted yield
deviations were decomposed using TETRAD IV software to determine the causal nature
of the variables to each other (Spirtes, Sheines, Ramsey, & Glymour, 2005). First the
deviations were sorted according to cropping practices involving irrigation and dryland
production. Limitations in TETRAD IV do not allow for all 42 state and district yield
variables listed in Table 3.2 to be analyzed all in the same DAG pattern. Correlations
between state and district variables show the strongest relationships involving those by
irrigation practice. Sorting irrigated and dryland time-adjusted deviations does not imply
a mutually exclusive property between the production methods, but a higher level of
relationship relevance and stability.
After sorting and uploading the variables to TETRAD IV, a DAG search
produced in Figure 3.2 for the irrigated variables and Figure 3.3 for the dryland
counterparts outline the causal relationships. Arrows or edges connecting the variable
sets show the directionality and relationships of patterns. Output images were sorted
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according to the base state variables leading lower aggregation level time-adjusted
district deviations. Based upon this assumption, district to state arrow directionalities
were reversed to reflect the larger state groups making them lower level variables. This
method assures that outcomes of all variables are consistent with the next higher level of
aggregation.
A line connecting two variables in a DAG, but not possessing an arrow to infer
causality in flow indicates an undirected edge. For these outlines the assumption was
made that the state or higher-level district variables directed the unspecified edge in the
lower level respective relationships. Also, DAG do not allow circular references among
variables. Undirected edges and arrows in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 use Fischer’s z-test
statistics to determine the DAG relationships which have statistical significance. Any
relationship failing to be statistically different from zero are not displayed on the
resulting image.
Figure 3.2 displays the appropriate relationships between the 17 irrigated timeadjusted yield deviations. Depending upon the strength of these interactions, causality of
the direct edges relays the direction. Simulation distributions must take these interactions
into consideration when modeling the system to examine yield variability on crop
revenue across different regions. Assumptions made about correlations between yield
parameters are affirmed by DAG analysis.
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Figure 3.2 Irrigated State and District Yield Deviation Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG)
Observations about Figure 3.2 carry through for the 16 dryland time-adjusted
yield deviations in Figure 3.3. Due to the limitations in cropping practices involving
dryland production, fewer regions have dryland soybeans versus irrigated soybeans.
Based upon the DAG diagram, district time-adjusted yield deviations were regressed on
the leading state or district variables according to the relationships documented. These
relationships between nodes allows for the identification of independent variables with
regards to a particular dependent variable.
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Figure 3.3 Dryland State and District Yield Deviation Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG)
As the linkage between district and county yields remain high due to a strong
correlation, direct relationships between these variables was drawn without a DAG
search. By using this assumption, the direct relationships by crop and production practice
between district and county variables serve as a basis of regressing lower-level yields off
the higher-level yields. By using this approach, correlations can be properly identified
and used, assuring a feasible simulation. Historical county yields by crop and practice
serve as the dependent variable in the regression off the independent higher-level district
yields. County simulation variables were not adjusted for the trend resulting from the
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time progression because independent district yields already account for this element in
the model.
To derive yields representative of expectations and variability for the model
farms, a stochastic component was added to the simulated county level yields in which a
particular farm lies. Miranda’s (1991) implied volatility procedure utilizing crop
insurance premiums allows for county level variability to be adjusted to the farm level.
The calibration method assumes crop insurance premiums are assessed at actuarially fair
rates. Also, the expected county and farm-level yield for a particular crop and practice
must be the same. Through this process, the average variability expressed by farms
operating in a particular county was obtained.
By modeling the distributions through the procedure described statistically
significant correlation relationships carry through with each random draw generated.
Observing these associations or connections between the revenue components remains
the core principle needed for evaluating a cohesive risk management strategy given a set
of alternatives. The following system of equations outlines the specific simulation and
regression procedures applied to generate stochastic yield and price distributions. Each
formula elaborates on national, state, district, county, or farm-level aggregation.
3.2.4 Equations
Estimated harvest-time average futures price distributions are simulated using
equation 3.1. Using a planting-time price for the starting parameter, the simulated
harvest-time average futures price draws upon historical variability to create the price
distribution. Adjusting the simulated harvest-time average futures price with a fixed
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basis produces the necessary cash price series for the risk management strategies under
evaluation.
(3.1)
where

simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery
of crop in time period
expected harvest-time futures price for harvest delivery of crop in
time period
estimated residual of futures price deviation between the expected average
futures price and the actual harvest-time average futures price for crop in time
period where
~N 0,

for

k

{corn, soybeans, wheat}
time period 2011

and
base planting-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of
crop k in time period
expected futures price deviation between planting-time and harvesttime average futures price for harvest delivery of crop in time period
and
where

is estimated from the following equation:
V
estimated intercept for the trend in price deviations of crop
estimated slope for the trend in price deviations of crop
as previously defined

where the regression is calculated on futures price deviation between planting-time and
harvest-time average futures price for harvest delivery of crop in time period
for the time period {t-30,..,t-1}
Estimated national MYA cash prices are simulated using equation 3.2. Using a
fixed basis derived from the previous five years of historical data, the simulated harvesttime futures price was adjusted to reflect the national MYA cash price. Basis
adjustments reflect the forces leading to the differences between the two price series.
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(3.2)
where

simulated national marketing year average cash price for crop

in time

period
simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery
of crop in time period
estimated basis between the simulated harvest-time 30-day average
futures price for harvest time delivery and national marketing year average cash
price of crop in time period
for

{corn, soybeans, wheat}
time period 2011
∑

and

estimated national marketing year basis from simulated futures
harvesting average for crop in time period
national marketing year average cash price for crop in time period
harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of crop
time period

in

for crop

where the basis estimate is calculated on the average difference of
k in time period {t-5,..,t-1}
Similar to the national MYA price average cash price equation, the state

marketing year average cash price is simulated using equation 3.3. Once again, using the
simulated harvest-time futures price serves as the base parameter, a fixed basis
adjustment to this price series creates the state MYA cash price. This simulated series
serves as the price parameter for the cash selling price of all grains marketed by the
representative farms.
(3.3)
where

simulated state marketing year average cash price for crop

in time

period
simulated harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery
of crop in time period
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estimated basis between the simulated harvest-time 30-day average
futures price for harvest time delivery and state marketing year average cash price
of crop in time period
for

and

{corn, soybeans, wheat}
time period 2011
∑

estimated state marketing year basis from simulated futures harvesting
average for crop in time period
state marketing year average cash price for crop in time period
harvest-time 30-day average futures price for harvest delivery of crop in
time period
where the basis estimate is calculated on the average difference of
k in time period {t-5,..,t-1}

for crop

National crop yield distributions are simulated using formula 3.4 by using a trend
line projection and past variability to generate the simulated distribution. Through a
system of moving trend lines, yield deviations were obtained from actual historical data.
Based upon this variability, projections for the simulation year create the national yield
distributions of the model. Trend adjustments were made to the deviations to reflect
productivity advancements of crop varieties.
(3.4)
where

for

simulated national yield for crop in time period
expected national yield for crop in time period
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted
national yield and the actual national yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
{corn, soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

and
estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop
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expected yield deviation between the expected national yield and the
actual national yield for crop in time period
where the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1}
and

is estimated from the following equation:

where
estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop
as previously defined
where the regression is calculated on deviations from trend line yields for the period {t30,..,t-1} and the trend yield in period t is calculated from regression on yields in
period {t-30,..,t-1}
State crop yield distributions are simulated using formula 3.5 following a similar
procedure as equation 3.4. Once again, by using trend line yields coupled with past
variation, the simulated projections reflect anticipated crop yield distributions at the state
level. Also, moving trend line yields was used to obtain deviations from expected yield
and were trend adjusted to reflect advancements in productivity.
(3.5)
where

for

simulated state yield for crop in time period
expected state yield for crop in time period
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted state
yield and the actual state yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
{corn, soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

and
estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop
expected yield deviation between the expected state yield and the
actual state yield for crop in time period
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where the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1}
and

is estimated from the following equation:

where
estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop
as previously defined
where the regression is calculated on deviations from trend line yields for the period {t30,..,t-1} and the trend yield in period t is calculated from regression on yields in
period {t-30,..,t-1}
To capture the relationships between equations 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 the error terms of
,

,

are correlated. By observing and maintaining these correlated

relationships, the model accounts for systemic risk shocks. These correlations may be
positive or negative and will vary in terms of the strength of a relationship. To carry
these relationships between the respected equations in the model the following error
terms are correlated.
where

estimated residual of futures price deviation between the expected average
futures price and the actual harvest-time average futures price for crop in time
period where
~N 0,
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the expected national
yield and the actual national yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the expected state yield
and the actual state yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,

for

{corn, irrigated corn, dryland corn, soybeans, irrigated soybeans, dryland
soybeans, wheat}
time period 2011
Residuals are then correlated using the mxn matrix
error terms

where

12

for all

,

,
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District crop yields are simulated using equation 3.6. This formula follows a
similar procedure to national and state yields, where a trend line projection and deviation
creates the simulated value. District yield deviations were obtained by finding the
difference between the moving trend line projection and actual historical data. After
trend adjusting these deviations, the variables were then regressed off other state or
district deviations according to cropping practice guided by the DAG search.
(3.6)
where

for

simulated district yield for crop in time period
expected district yield for crop in time period
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted
district yield and the actual district yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
{10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90}
{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

and
estimated intercept for the trend in yield of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield of crop
expected yield deviation between the expected district yield and the
actual district yield for crop in time period
where the regression is calculated on yields from time period {t-30,..t-1}
and

is estimated from the following equations:

where
estimated intercept for the trend in yield deviations of crop
estimated slope for the trend in yield deviations of crop
estimated DAG residual for the relationship between state and other
district yields and district yields for crop
and

∑

∑
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estimated intercept for the relationship between state and other district
yields and district yields for crop
estimated slope for the relationship between state and district yields for
crop
estimated slope for the relationship between state and other district yields
and district yields for crop
as previously defined
where

is estimated from regression of time series adjusted deviations at the district
level on time series adjusted deviations at the state and district level using
hierarchal estimation procedures determined through the Tetrad DAG for
{10,
20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90} and
{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated
soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat}
Following a direct relationship to district yields, county yields are simulated using

equation 3.7. The expected county yield and standard deviation are regressed off the
district corresponding district yield by crop and practice. Regressing county yields off of
district yields carries correlations between each level of the simulation.
(3.7)
where

for

simulated county yield for crop in time period
expected county yield for crop in time period
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted
county yield and the actual county yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
{Morrill, Holt, Wayne, Sherman, Butler, Hayes, Kearney, Saline}
{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

and
estimated intercept for the relationship between district and county yields
of crop
estimated slope for the relationship between district and county yields of
crop
as previously defined
where

is estimated from the regression of county j yields calculated on simulated
district i yield of crop k in time period t in which , take on the following
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paired values: {(10, Morrill), (20, Holt), (30, Wayne), (50, Sherman), (60, Butler),
(70, Hayes), (80, Kearney), (90, Saline)}
Farm-level yields are simulated using equation 3.8. Yields on the representative
farms have an average equal to county yield, but a variability level implied from crop
insurance premiums for the 2011 production year. Miranda’s formula allowed for the
calibration of county-level yields to the representative farm.
(3.8)
where

for

Y

simulated farm yield for crop in time period
expected farm yield for crop in time period
estimated residual of the yield deviation between the trend adjusted farm
yield and the actual farm yield for crop in time period where
~N 0,
10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

and
where expected farm yield for crop
crop in time period
and

in time period is equal to the county yield for

is the idiosyncratic farm-level risk determined by using Miranda’s formula
to expand county yield variability into farm-level variability that generates quoted
RMA premium rates
Similar to Coble and Dismukes’(2008) procedure, Miranda’s Formula (1991) was

used to expand a county yield to a farm-level yield expressing idiosyncratic risk implied
by the RMA crop insurance quotes specific to farms lying in a particular county. Crop
insurance premiums utilized in calibrating the yields had an assumed APH yield equal to
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the farm’s specific county. Also, quotes obtained were for the 2011 production year
(Farmdoc, 2011).

where

Y

simulated farm yield for crop in time period
expected farm yield for crop in time period
measures the responsiveness in farm yield for crop in comparison to
county yield for crop in time period
simulated county yield for crop in time period
expected county yield for crop in time period
represents the estimated idiosyncratic level risk from calibrating county
yield for crop to an average standard deviation equivalent to the expected
~N 0,
variation on farm for crop k in time period t where
10, 20, 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
{Morrill, Holt, Wayne, Sherman, Butler, Hayes, Kearney, Saline}
{irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, dryland soybeans, wheat}
time period for production year 2011

for

and
where expected farm yield for crop in time period is equal to the expected county
yield for crop in time period
1

and

where one represents the acreage weight of all yields in the county
from insurance
To derive the estimated farm-level standard deviation
premiums for crop in time period , a grid search was used to find the minimum
absolute value between the average expected premium rate and expected loss.
where Min
for

the average effective premium rate for 65% coverage crop yield
insurance on farm for crop during time period
simulated expected loss cost given in county for crop in time
period
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and
for

crop insurance price guarantee on farm i for crop k in time period t
coverage level on farm i for crop k in time period t
The expected loss cost was derived by comparing the ratio of indemnities
and
. After setting
equal to 0.65, a
conditioned on the guarantee
standard deviation grid search between 10 to 60 in intervals of 2 for
was
conducted and identified the value which minimized the difference between
and
.
The series of simulation equations created the variables necessary for evaluating

different risk management strategies. Equations established in the model ensured proper
relationships and correlations are observed between each aggregation level. Validation
preformed on the model ensured the integrity of the simulation results.
3.2.5 Validation
To validate the simulation model, 500 stochastically simulated yield and price
draws were used to verify the distribution against actual historical data. These iterations
were produced using a randomized year instead of the fixed trend year of 2011 to allow
for the comparison of actual and simulated sample means and variances. Evaluations of
results were similar when using normalized distributions for prices and yields at different
aggregation levels. Also, test statistics showed correlations between the model
parameters were statistically significant. Validation verified the accuracy of relationships
between different parameters to ultimately allow for evaluation of different risk
management strategies across the representative farms.
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3.3 Simulation Software
To analyze yield and price variables across different risk management strategies,
each simulation must contain a sufficient number of draws from the underlying
distribution to consistently express the variation present. Each alternative risk
management strategy must carry the same variable distribution for each particular
scenario. Comparing the effects stabilization strategies have on crop revenue requires
efficient methodology to examine these values. Producers possessing different risk
preferences require different methodologies to compare strategies. Incorporating these
simulation and preference details is necessary to accurately assess different strategies.
3.3.1 SIMETAR
A model of the correlated equations is constructed and analyzed using the
software package Simulation & Econometrics to Analyze Risk (SIMETAR) developed at
Texas A&M University (Richardson, Schumann, & Feldman, 2008). As an add-on to the
Microsoft Office 2010 Excel platform, distributions drawn in the program allow for each
stochastic draw to maintain proper statistical relationships. Also, each random yield and
price set can be used to analyze different risk management scenarios, allowing for
comparison between the different approaches. Analysis tools incorporated in the
simulation package have the ability to evaluate different alternatives given a range of risk
preferences.
3.3.2 Procedure
Each analysis of the model utilizes 500 random draws from the yield and price
distributions. To generate these yield and price sets, SIMETAR’s simulation engine
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follows the Latin Hypercube iteration process. Under this methodology, each distribution
being modeled must be stratified to cumulative probability scale from which each
element has the likelihood of an equal draw. The Latin Hypercube’s main advantage
over the other commonly utilized Monte Carlo technique is an accurate distribution of the
cumulative probability scale, whereas the second methodology may over- or underestimate a particular element of the distribution. Using 500 iterations under the Latin
Hypercube simulation procedure allows for a draw to properly cover a representation of
the moments within a set (Richardson, Schumann, & Feldman, 2004).
Each alternative risk management scenario is evaluated using the same yield and
price set to compare and draw inferences from the strategies. Scenarios in SIMETAR
allow for each exact moment in iteration to be repeated under a different revenue
stabilization strategy. The analysis evaluates each alternative risk management strategy
for the effect these tools have on stabilizing crop revenue given a producer’s risk
preference. Tools incorporated in SIMETAR for the analysis of distributional outcomes
include First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD), Second Degree Stochastic Dominance
(SDS), Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function (SDRF), StopLight charts, and
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF).
Base crop revenue without any revenue stabilization strategy serves as the
standard for comparing the other eight risk management strategies. Using a constant risk
aversion assumption with a decreasing relative risk preference, FSD and SDS rank
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) drawn from the simulated revenue
distributions and sorts these functions according to the probability of a certain level of
income. The strategy which dominates in receiving the highest level of income serves as
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the most ideal scenario, but may cross an opposing strategy for FSD and only once for
SDS. A limitation of using this technique remains the assumption producers have a
constant level of risk aversion, whereas individuals may have different preferences
(Richardson, Klose, & Gray, 2000).
SDRF is similar to the SDS methodology, but allows for different risk aversion
preferences. Based upon a producer’s wealth factor, a Risk Aversion Coefficient (RAC)
allows for lower and upper parameters to evaluate the most efficient set based upon
available alternatives. One limitation remains in that all pairwise correlation
combinations must be run on the simulated distributions to determine the optimal
scenario.
Another common method for ranking risky multiple scenarios involve StopLight
charts. These images graphically display the probability over multiple scenarios the
likelihood of favorable (green) results, unfavorable (red) results, and results between the
two parameters (yellow). To establish the favorable and unfavorable criteria, values must
be established to display the output in appropriate ranges. Interpretation of the charts
show the alternative with the greatest amount of green and the least red region indicate
the most preferred scenario (Richardson et al., 2000).
SERF has advantages over the shortcomings of SDS and SDRF, but still allows
for different preferences involving RACs. Under this process a Certainty Equivalent
(CE) must be calculated for RACs between an upper and lower value for the risk-towealth factor. Next, a graph of the analyzed data indicates over a range of risk-to-wealth
factors which CE for a particular alternative is the greatest. The measurement between
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two CE points represents the amount of wealth which will be forgone if the producer had
to accept the next lower set given a particular RAC range (Richardson et al., 2000).
A combination of these techniques allows for the analysis of simulated crop
revenue distributions and risk management strategies. Selecting the appropriate
alternatives or scenarios remains essential for drawing the appropriate inferences on crop
revenue risk management strategies at the individual farm or region level. Also, these
procedures allow for concluding inferences on the performance of the risk management
alternatives across the state.
3.4 Scenarios
Producers have multiple risk management tools available to stabilize and reduce
declines in crop revenue from losses in yield or price. These programs or products base
guarantees off benchmark parameters. Depending upon the assumptions for base yield
and price values, resulting simulation distributions may have significantly different
results. When determining the values for base simulation prices, the purpose and design
of various government programs must be kept in mind. In addition to the base simulation
parameters, specific scenarios need selection to limit the scope of modeling complexity
and allow for solid inferences to be drawn across multiple farms. Interactions at the
individual farm level lead to inferences on strategies and potential policy implications for
risk management tool design.
3.4.1 Alternatives
Producers face decisions on revenue stabilization strategies involving government
programs, crop insurance products, and marketing tools. Figure 3.4 documents the
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individual components of each available for a particular decision level through the end of
the 2012 production year. At the core of revenue stabilization, these programs or
products base guarantees off crop yield, price, or revenue. Decision makers do not make
selection of a particular option mutually exclusive from a subsequent option (Pennings et
al., 2008). For a given price and yield base, a total of 36 different scenarios exist if all of
the options listed below were analyzed.

Figure 3.4 Crop Revenue Risk Management Diagram
Assumptions made regarding the selection of scenarios limit key output variable
analysis to allow for a cohesive examination among the representative farms. Summary
statistics drawn from simulation results indicate the effects different set strategies have on
crop revenue. The results also can provide insight on future research and policy
implications for programs and products.
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3.4.2 Scenario Assumptions
To analyze a feasible set of scenarios involving crop revenue risk management
alternatives, assumptions must be made about the underlying logic implied in producer
level decision making. Alternative crop revenue stabilization tools documented in Figure
3.4 show producers have to make choices regarding government programs, crop
insurance products, and marketing strategy levels. Based upon Figure 3.4, simulation
scenarios outlined in Table 3.3 display nine alternatives to evaluate for the eight
representative sites across Nebraska. These scenarios serve as the basis for discussion
involving specified risk management strategies for the following analysis, results, and
conclusion discussion.
Scenarios 1-9 in Table 3.3 show the base comparison and alternative strategies
involving three different groups of risk management tools. In control case of Scenario 1,
the farmer does not participate in any government program or purchase any crop
insurance product and all commodities are cash marketed at harvest-time. Next,
Scenarios 2-5 and 6-9 group the scenarios according to whether a producer participates in
the government options of DCP or ACRE. Producers participating in either of these
options have a base guaranteed DP; rational producers will choose to participate in one of
the two not considering any limits or costs of farm program participation. Separate from
the guaranteed revenue, producers make assumptions about the performance of DCP
versus ACRE in stabilizing systemic losses through either revenue or price guarantees.
Evaluating whether a reduction in direct payments associated with participating in ACRE
outweighs the potential crop revenue stabilization received under the newer program
remains a fundamental question.
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Table 3.3 Simulation Scenarios including Government Programs, Crop Insurance
Products, and Marketing Strategies
Alternative
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Scenario 8
Scenario 9
1
2

3

1

Government

Crop

2

3

Program
Insurance
Abbreviations
NP-NI-CM No Program No Insurance
DCP-RP-CM
DCP
RP 70%
DCP-RP-FH
DCP
RP 70%
DCP-YP-CM
DCP
YP 70%
DCP-YP-FH
DCP
YP 70%
ACRE-RP-CM
ACRE
RP 70%
ACRE-RP-FH
ACRE
RP 70%
ACRE-YP-CM
ACRE
YP 70%
ACRE-YP-FH
ACRE
YP 70%

Marketing
Strategy
Cash Market
Cash Market
Futures Hedge
Cash Market
Futures Hedge
Cash Market
Futures Hedge
Cash Market
Futures Hedge

Government Program-Crop Insurance Product-Marketing Strategy
DCP = Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program
ACRE = Average Crop Revenue Election
RP 70% = Revenue Protection 70%
YP 70%= Yield Protection 70%
Noted with corresponding levels of coverage.

After government program selection, producers must decide upon a crop
insurance product and level of coverage. Participation rates indicate the top three policies
sold to grain and oilseed producers in Nebraska during the 2010 production year, in
order, include RP, YP, and RP-HPE. When examining coverage levels for these products
on insured cropland acres, coverage rates for 70% account for the largest percentage of
RP and RP-HPE units underwritten in the state. Due to very low sales of RP-HPE, this
particular product is excluded from the analysis (USDA Risk Management Agency,
2011b). After taking these factors into account, an appropriate pair of crop insurance
products to evaluate includes RP and YP with a coverage rate of 70%.
Finally, marketing strategies encompass the third component in this analysis.
Producers have the ability to use a cash marketing (CM), futures hedge (FH), or options
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strategy in marketing of grain. Setting price protection at different levels remains a
process reflecting a producer’s cost of production, personal perception, and anticipation
of future events. Also, placement of options remains subjective depending upon strike
prices and premium values or costs for a particular commodity. CM or a FH are less
complicated to place and carryout for simulation scenario design. These two alternatives
remain feasible alternatives when attempting to evaluate the effects of basic marketing
strategies.
Under the CM alternative, producers are assumed to sell the entire simulated
production at the state MYA price. Common hedging practices limit the amount of grain
marketed before harvest in a particular production year up to the crop insurance
guarantee and therefore, placing a hedge involving 70% of the expected yield would fit
within industry standards. Based upon this reasoning, the two marketing strategies for
analysis include cash marketing all production or hedging 70% of expected yield
equivalent at the 30-day planting-time average futures price for a particular commodity,
lifting the hedge at harvest time, and subsequently selling the actual production at the
state MYA price.
All scenarios use the same starting 2011 expected yield projections and plantingtime price averages. Also, guarantees for government programs and crop insurance
products are consistent with those available during the 2011 production year.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Results from the stochastic simulation serve as the foundation of analysis and
conclusions to draw recommendations for producers. Depending upon risk preferences
and financial conditions, an individual’s preferred strategy may vary. Since attitudes and
preferences vary amongst producers, one single methodology cannot represent the
decision-making standard for everyone. The goal and scope of this analysis focuses on
determining how the optimal choice varies across different evaluation standards.
Indirectly, the level of variability expressed across different regions of the state may
affect estimates of risk and the optimal strategy depending upon an individual producer’s
location.
4.1 Overview of Analysis Methods
Multiple methods exist to examine stochastic financial simulations. Each
approach has various advantages and disadvantages with corresponding assumptions
utilized to analyze a particular scenario. The five procedures utilized in this analysis
include: Expected Value (EV), Coefficient of Variation (CV), Stochastic Dominance
(SD), StopLight charts, and SERF. Each section evaluates the various assumptions
necessary to employ one of the five stochastic procedures. Based upon these parameters,
each analysis highlights the optimal scenario for a given farm and implications on the
selection of risk management strategies across the state.
4.2 Results
The following stochastic analysis follows the order of EV, CV, SD, StopLight
charts, and SERF. Within each section the optimal choice will be highlighted in a table
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format along with a summary of each procedure in the conclusion. References in
Appendices A through D provide additional results for each analysis from which a
section’s condensed tables or figures are drawn.
4.2.1 Expected Value
An EV represents the mean under a specific statistical distribution given a set of
probabilities for occurrences involving each specific event. When applied to one of the
nine different simulation scenarios for a particular representative farm, an EV indicates
the anticipated average gross farm revenue under a specific alternative for each farm.
This mean is the average gross farm revenue over the 500 randomized draws where each
event has the same statistical probability of occurring for a specific scenario. In the case
of expected gross farm revenue, the highest EV represents the most desired outcome.
Gross farm revenue in the following analysis refers to income adjusted for net crop
insurance and marketing costs.
Table 4.1 Expected Gross Farm Revenue by Representative Farm under Simulation
Scenarios
1
Representative
Risk Management Scenarios
Farm
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm
$604,574
$644,894
$641,226
$643,533
$639,865
$640,624
$636,956
$639,263
$635,595
District 20 Farm
1,359,031
1,401,590
1,411,524
1,402,079
1,412,012
1,395,248
1,405,182
1,395,736
1,405,670
District 30 Farm
1,007,463
1,032,497
1,036,303
1,031,480
1,035,286
1,028,682
1,032,488
1,027,665
1,031,472
District 50 Farm
1,190,801
1,229,695
1,239,896
1,229,884
1,240,086
1,224,142
1,234,343
1,224,332
1,234,533
District 60 Farm
900,449
935,833
939,096
933,758
937,022
931,515
934,778
929,441
932,704
District 70 Farm
1,175,721
1,232,241
1,238,018
1,230,367
1,236,144
1,225,559
1,231,336
1,223,685
1,229,462
District 80 Farm
1,136,410
1,172,856
1,177,524
1,172,099
1,176,767
1,167,120
1,171,788
1,166,364
1,171,032
District 90 Farm
946,216
988,838
991,511
986,875
989,548
984,143
986,817
982,180
984,854

1

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

Statistics provided in Table 4.1 highlight the expected gross farm revenue for the
eight representative farms in Nebraska under the nine alternative simulation scenarios.
The highest EV by representative farm includes: DCP-RP-CM for District 10,
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DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 60, 70, 80, and 90.
A basic conclusion from the EV analysis shows participating in any of the risk
management strategies provides larger expected gross farm revenue than the base
scenario of NP-NI-CM. Also, none of the four scenarios containing ACRE were
preferred using the EV procedure.
Table 4.2 Expected Gross Farm Revenue per Acre by Representative Farm under
Simulation Scenarios
1
Representative
Risk Management Scenarios
Farm
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm
$484.70
$517.03
$514.09
$515.94
$512.99
$513.60
$510.66
$512.51
$509.57
District 20 Farm
986.72
1,017.62
1,024.83
1,017.97
1,025.18
1,013.01
1,020.22
1,013.37
1,020.58
District 30 Farm
948.66
972.23
975.81
971.27
974.86
968.64
972.22
967.68
971.26
District 50 Farm
1,056.14
1,090.63
1,099.68
1,090.80
1,099.85
1,085.71
1,094.76
1,085.88
1,094.92
District 60 Farm
877.83
912.32
915.51
910.30
913.48
908.11
911.30
906.09
909.27
District 70 Farm
732.84
768.07
771.67
766.90
770.50
763.91
767.51
762.74
766.34
District 80 Farm
946.39
976.74
980.63
976.11
980.00
971.97
975.85
971.34
975.22
District 90 Farm
782.42
817.67
819.88
816.04
818.26
813.79
816.00
812.16
814.37

1

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

Analyzing the expected gross farm revenue on a per acre basis in Table 4.2
provides the same results as given in Table 4.1. Per acre average revenue comes from the
expected gross farm revenue divided by the total number of cropland acres per farm.
Evaluating per acre revenue shows how the anticipated revenue varies across the state
due to cropping practices and productivity differences with expected revenue typically
lower in the western, more arid regions of the state.
One limitation of the EV procedure is the inability to take into consideration the
variability of gross farm revenue. Some producers may be more receptive to reducing
revenue variability. The ability of producers to tolerate revenue losses may be subject to
the level of variability in farm revenue when suffering yield or price declines. When
analyzing gross farm revenue with a CV measurement, a level of variability may be
defined for the set of risk management strategies.
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4.2.2 Coefficient of Variation
The CV measures the proportion of the standard deviation to the mean for a set of
data. A standard deviation measures the dispersion of a set of data from the mean. When
interpreting the CV over a set of scenarios, the smallest percentage value indicates the
distribution with the least variation relative to the mean. Producers seeking the lowest
revenue variability relative to the mean across the set of scenarios would choose the
outcome with the lowest CV value. The lowest CV measurement may or may not have
the highest expected value.
Table 4.3 Expected Gross Farm Revenue (GFR) and Coefficient of Variation (CV)
by Representative Farm under Simulation Scenarios
Representative
Farm
District 10 Farm

Risk Management Scenarios

1

2

Variable NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
GFR ($)
604,574
644,894
641,226
643,533
639,865
640,624
636,956
639,263
635,595
CV (%)
26.61
20.71
19.81
21.29
20.38
20.83
19.93
21.41
20.50

District 20 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

1,359,031
21.90

1,401,590
19.11

1,411,524
17.50

1,402,079
19.44

1,412,012
17.81

1,395,248
19.19

1,405,182
17.58

1,395,736
19.52

1,405,670
17.89

District 30 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

1,007,463
17.50

1,032,497
15.96

1,036,303
14.38

1,031,480
16.21

1,035,286
14.59

1,028,682
16.00

1,032,488
14.42

1,027,665
16.26

1,031,472
14.63

District 50 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

1,190,801
22.47

1,229,695
19.31

1,239,896
17.90

1,229,884
19.76

1,240,086
18.29

1,224,142
19.40

1,234,343
17.97

1,224,332
19.85

1,234,533
18.37

District 60 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

900,449
17.31

935,833
14.81

939,096
13.26

933,758
15.23

937,022
13.58

931,515
14.87

934,778
13.31

929,441
15.30

932,704
13.63

District 70 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

1,175,721
21.75

1,232,241
17.72

1,238,018
16.82

1,230,367
18.31

1,236,144
17.32

1,225,559
17.82

1,231,336
16.91

1,223,685
18.41

1,229,462
17.42

District 80 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

1,136,410
16.76

1,172,856
14.83

1,177,524
13.47

1,172,099
15.15

1,176,767
13.73

1,167,120
14.90

1,171,788
13.53

1,166,364
15.22

1,171,032
13.79

District 90 Farm

GFR ($)
CV (%)

946,216
18.11

988,838
15.22

991,511
14.10

986,875
15.54

989,548
14.35

984,143
15.29

986,817
14.16

982,180
15.60

984,854
14.41

1
2

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
GFR = Expected Gross Farm Revenue
CV = Coefficient of Variation

CV values for the eight representative farms under the nine different simulation
scenarios are displayed in Table 4.3. Further detail on the minimums, maximums, and
standard deviations of the revenue distributions may be viewed in Table A.1 of
Appendix A. Analysis of Table 4.3 shows the lowest CV for all representative farms as
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DCP-RP-FH. This is counter to the EV analysis for some districts, where the most
optimal outcomes for representative farms were DCP-RP-CM in District 10 and
DCP-YP-FH in District 20 and 50. EV for these farms and scenarios have higher
monetary values, but also have higher CV. In comparison to gross farm revenue, the
differences are relatively small, but show a fundamental difference in the two procedures.
Reducing revenue variability versus seeking the highest expected value introduces
probability in forming confidence intervals of revenue distributions. Having the lowest
coefficient of variation in one of the nine scenarios shows the operation may have the
least variability, but may limit beneficial movements in commodity price with a futures
hedge. For certain operations, the least variability in gross farm revenue may be the most
desired. Coupling distributional probabilities with expected values presents another
manner in which to analyze the nine scenarios. SD represents the methodology to
evaluate the probability and expected value of a distribution under a given risk preference
which overcomes the limitations of EV and CV.
4.2.3 Stochastic Dominance
Analysis tools included under the SD category include FSD, SDS, and SDRF. In
the FSD methodology the basic assumption is that the risk taker prefers more money to
less (Richardson & Outlaw, 2008). When related to probability theory, this concept
implies a scenario with the highest likelihood to occur when the scenarios are ranked on a
CDF chart.
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

Figure 4.1 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 70 for
Alternative Scenarios 1
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As an example CDF chart, Figure 4.1 displays the nine simulation scenarios for
the representative farm in District 70 with the corresponding statistical probability and
ranking of each alternative. Refer to Appendix B containing Figures B.1 through B.8 for
the CDF charts involving all eight representative farms. An approximation for the
probability of receiving a certain level of gross farm revenue or less under a given
scenario may be identified by locating dollar value on the x-axis, tracing vertically up to
the appropriate CDF curve, and then following horizontally over to the corresponding
probability on the y-axis. FSD shows the most preferred scenario as the alternative
furthest to the right on CDF chart, which has the largest probability of obtaining the
greatest level of farm revenue.
Analysis of Figures B.1 through B.8 in Appendix B shows a similar pattern to the
CDF of Figure 4.1. In all of the CDFs, the ability to identify one scenario FSD to the
other alternatives is not possible. FSD requires all elements of a particular scenario to not
overlap an opposing alterative when graphed on a CDF chart. Clearly overlap occurs for
the nine alternative risk management scenarios. One interesting point to note regarding
the CDF charts involves the NP-NI-CM scenario which does not utilize an active crop
insurance product or government program. The horizontal distance between the
NP-NI-CM scenarios and the opposing scenarios may be attributed to DPs and subsidized
crop yield or revenue insurance.
FSD does not provide an optimal recommendation for the representative farms
because of the overlaps in the gross farm revenue CDFs involving the nine alternative
scenarios. SDS methodology overcomes the limitations of FSD, but requires two major
assumptions. First, the technique assumes the decision-maker has constant absolute risk
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aversion with decreasing preferences for more risky alternatives. Secondly, this process
disregards a decision-maker’s utility function. Also, SDS has to rank all of the possible
pairs of risk management scenarios which may result in an analyzed set with more than
one optimal outcome (Richardson & Outlaw, 2008).
The third stochastic dominance procedure relevant to analysis of CDF charts
incorporates utility. SDRF couples SDS with utility by introducing constant RACs.
Lower and upper RAC values are set according to an individual’s risk preference.
Problems with this process occur when the decision-maker has preferences which are
different for the lower and upper RAC values, as more than one optimal outcome may
exist in a set of alternatives. Similar to SDS, all pairwise correlations of the simulation
scenarios must be analyzed and could result in an efficient set being very small
(Richardson & Outlaw, 2008). Due to these issues, SDS and SDRF do not provide clear
abilities to analyze the nine different risk management scenarios.
CDF charts display the probability of ascertaining a certain level of revenue under
a particular simulation scenario. Without a concise stochastic dominance methodology to
rank these approaches, the shortcomings of EV and CV analysis still present problems.
The StopLight procedure provides an approach not limited by the issues of SD, yet still
represents the probability of achieving a defined level of revenue and allows the analysis
to take into consideration different risk preferences.
4.2.4 StopLight Charts
StopLight charts measure the probability of favorable and unfavorable events
given critical cut-off values. These limits are placed according to the decision-maker’s
preference in financial simulations; the values represent the probability of achieving a
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certain level of revenue or income. An appropriate parameter for many revenue purposes
relates to the ability to cover different types of expenses. Based upon the probability of
reaching these levels of income an optimal strategy may be identified depending upon the
decision-maker’s risk preference.
The probabilities of achieving benchmark parameters in a StopLight chart
correspond to red (unfavorable), yellow (cautionary), and green (favorable) events in a
bar chart format. Unfavorable events represent the likelihood of falling below the lower
cut-off value. Next, cautionary developments show the probability of an outcome
occurring between the lower and upper cut-off value. Finally, the favorable events
happen when the simulation draw exceeds the upper cut-off value (Outlaw and
Richardson, 2008). Depending upon the critical lower and upper cut-off values used in
the analysis, the probabilities may change significantly.
In general, for risk-averse individuals, the most preferred alternative appears as
the scenario containing the least red (unfavorable) and most green (favorable). Using this
methodology to select the optimal outcome is consistent with utility theory. Individuals
are assumed to gain more satisfaction from more revenue compared to less and more
satisfaction from higher probabilities of achieving critical levels of revenue (Richardson
& Outlaw, 2008). StopLight charts combine probability and risk preferences in a manner
which overcomes the shortcomings of EV, CV, and SD techniques. For the purpose of
analyzing the nine alternative risk management scenarios, a set of critical values and
preferences are constructed from production estimates.
Approximations for variable and total crop production expenses come from
USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) ARMS 2009-2010 Annual Cost and Return
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Estimates for corn, soybeans, and wheat. These surveys group Nebraska crop producers
into three different ARMS regions. The 2009-2010 analysis reports allowed for the
estimation of variable and total economic costs on a percentage basis of per-acre crop
production values. Variable costs include the operating costs of seed, fertilizer,
chemicals, custom operations, fuel, lube, electricity, repairs, purchases of irrigation
water, and interest on operating costs. Total costs include all variable costs in addition to
hired labor, opportunity costs of unpaid labor, capital recovery of machinery and
equipment, opportunity costs of land (rental rate), taxes and insurance, and general farm
overhead (USDA Economic Research Service, 2012).
Next, expenses for the representative farms are estimated as a percentage of
expected revenue under the NP-NI-CM scenario on a per acre basis according to the
ARMS region in which these farms would be found. By multiplying these estimates by
the corresponding number of acres by crop type, costs were summed for the entire
operation. Approximations for these variable and total economic expenses provide
critical cut-off values to gauge stochastic gross farm revenues.
As an example StopLight chart, Figure 4.2 displays the nine simulation scenarios
for the representative farm in District 70 with lower and upper cut-off values of $699,198
and $1,131,710. Refer to Appendix C containing Figures C.1 through C.8 for the
StopLight charts involving all eight representative farms. The lower and upper cut-off
values represent estimated variable and total economic costs of production for the
representative farm in District 70.

Lower Cut-Off Value 699,198
Upper Cut-Off Value 1,131,710
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
2
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0.38
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0.00
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0.00
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0.00
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0.64

0.00
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0.66

0.00
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0.00
0.34
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0.00
0.37
0.63

0.00
0.34
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0.64

0.66
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0.66

0.62

0.66

0.63

0.66

0.36

0.34

0.36

0.34

0.38

0.34

0.37

0.34

DCP-RP-CM

DCP-RP-FH

DCP-YP-CM

90%
80%
70%

0.58

60%
50%
40%
30%
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0.38

10%
0%

0.03
NP-NI-CM

1
2

DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure 4.2 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 70 for Alternative Scenarios1
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As an example scenario in Figure 4.2, NP-NI-CM shows the distribution of the
simulated crop revenue distribution without participating in any government programs,
crop insurance products, or marketing strategies. Under this scenario, only about a 3.0%
probability exists of not being able to cover variable expenses and 41% is the probability
of not meeting total costs. More interestingly, a 58.0% chance exists of exceeding
estimated total costs. The remaining eight scenarios all exceed estimated variable costs
and do not show any unfavorable (red) regions on the respective bars of the alternatives.
Assuming each operation has risk-averse preferences, the optimal scenario is the
one which has the highest probability of exceeding total costs. In the event two scenarios
have the same probability of exceeding total costs, the alternative having the higher
expected value is identified as the optimal outcome. For the entire set of representative
farms, DCP-RP-FH serves as the optimal outcome, except for District 50, where
DCP-YP-FH provides the most desired outcome. The only difference between the two
scenarios comes from the crop insurance selection of YP instead of RP in District 50.
For further detail on individual StopLight charts of the representative farms, refer
to Appendix C containing Figures C.1 through C.8. Each chart in the Appendix C
represents the StopLight analysis for each farm using estimated variable and total
expenses for that farm as the lower and upper cut-off critical values. Table 4.4 provides a
summary of these charts under the nine different simulation scenarios. Intervals shown in
the table represent the likelihood of expected gross farm revenue exceeding total costs,
greater than variable costs and less than total costs, and falling below variable costs.
These levels represent the probability of favorable, cautionary, and unfavorable event
depictions of the StopLight charts in Figures C.1 through C.8.

64

Table 4.4 Expected Gross Farm Revenue (GFR) and StopLight Chart Analysis
Summarizing Simulation Scenarios
1

District 10 Farm

Risk Management Scenarios
2

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
$604,574
$644,894
$641,226
$643,533
$639,865
$640,624
$636,956
$639,263
$635,595
Prob(GFR > TC)
66.4%
74.6%
76.8%
74.6%
76.6%
73.4%
76.0%
73.4%
75.6%
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
31.8%
25.4%
23.2%
25.4%
23.4%
26.6%
24.0%
26.6%
24.4%
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
1.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Critical Values
Variable Costs (VC) =
$249,543
Total Costs (TC) =
$539,213
District 20 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$1,359,031 $1,401,590 $1,411,524 $1,402,079 $1,412,012
$1,395,248
$1,405,182
$1,395,736
$1,405,670
80.2%
86.6%
86.8%
86.0%
86.4%
84.6%
86.4%
85.2%
85.8%
19.4%
13.4%
13.2%
14.0%
13.6%
15.4%
13.6%
14.8%
14.2%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$533,515
Total Costs (TC) =
$1,089,536

District 30 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$1,007,463 $1,032,497 $1,036,303 $1,031,480 $1,035,286
$1,028,682
$1,032,488
$1,027,665
$1,031,472
89.2%
93.8%
94.8%
93.0%
94.0%
93.4%
94.4%
92.6%
93.6%
10.8%
6.2%
5.2%
7.0%
6.0%
6.6%
5.6%
7.4%
6.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$352,428
Total Costs (TC) =
$796,831

District 50 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$1,190,801 $1,229,695 $1,239,896 $1,229,884 $1,240,086
$1,224,142
$1,234,343
$1,224,332
$1,234,533
66.6%
70.0%
73.2%
70.0%
73.2%
69.4%
72.4%
69.4%
72.6%
32.0%
30.0%
26.8%
30.0%
26.8%
30.6%
27.6%
30.6%
27.4%
1.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$553,746
Total Costs (TC) =
$1,078,379

District 60 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$900,449
$935,833
$939,096
$933,758
$937,022
$931,515
$934,778
$929,441
$932,704
88.4%
97.2%
98.2%
96.0%
97.8%
96.6%
98.2%
95.8%
98.0%
11.6%
2.8%
1.8%
4.0%
2.2%
3.4%
1.8%
4.2%
2.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$311,692
Total Costs (TC) =
$711,338

District 70 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$1,175,721 $1,232,241 $1,238,018 $1,230,367 $1,236,144
$1,225,559
$1,231,336
$1,223,685
$1,229,462
58.2%
63.6%
66.4%
63.6%
66.2%
62.2%
65.6%
62.6%
65.6%
38.4%
36.4%
33.6%
36.4%
33.8%
37.8%
34.4%
37.4%
34.4%
3.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$699,198
Total Costs (TC) =
$1,131,710

District 80 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$1,136,410 $1,172,856 $1,177,524 $1,172,099 $1,176,767
$1,167,120
$1,171,788
$1,166,364
$1,171,032
68.0%
74.0%
75.2%
74.2%
75.2%
72.6%
74.8%
72.8%
74.4%
32.0%
26.0%
24.8%
25.8%
24.8%
27.4%
25.2%
27.2%
25.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$562,166
Total Costs (TC) =
$1,051,547

District 90 Farm
2

StopLight Cut-Offs
Expected GFR
Prob(GFR > TC)
Prob(VC < GFR ≤ TC)
Prob(GFR ≤ VC)
Critical Values
1
2

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
$946,216
$988,838
$991,511
$986,875
$989,548
$984,143
$986,817
$982,180
$984,854
67.4%
80.4%
83.0%
79.8%
81.8%
79.6%
82.0%
78.4%
81.0%
32.4%
19.6%
17.0%
20.2%
18.2%
20.4%
18.0%
21.6%
19.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Variable Costs (VC) =
$408,343
Total Costs (TC) =
$855,988

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
GFR = Gross Farm Revenue
TC = Total Costs include variable and estimated hired labor, opportunity cost of unpaid labor, capital recovery of machinery and equipment,
opportunity costs of land (rental rate), taxes, insurance, and general farm overhead expenses.
VC = Variable Costs including estimated seed, fertilizer, chemicals, custom operations, fuel, lube, electricity, repairs, purchased irrigation water,
and interests on operating capital expenses.
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General observations show the probability of expected gross farm revenue falling
below variable costs is negligible for 2011. Given starting yield and price scenario
baselines, the amount of simulated gross crop revenue has an extremely low probability
of not being able to cover variable costs. Risk management scenarios excluding the
NP-NI-CM alternative show participating in one of these arrangements allows for
guarantees to exceed all estimated variable costs for all eight representative farms.
Results vary considerably on the probability of these operations covering variable
expenses, but not covering total costs. Several factors contribute to this result, including
crop mix and production practices modeled for each representative farm. As an example,
those representative farms with more irrigated acres and those located in the eastern
portion of the state have less simulated negative revenue outcomes compared to those of
the western panhandle. Similar results exist for the likelihood of exceeding total costs.
StopLight charts provide a stochastic analysis procedure which couples
probability and expected outcomes together. Some shortcomings of previous analysis
tools including EV, CV, and SD are overcome by the StopLight chart analysis. One
assumption limiting the StopLight analysis comes from the constant risk aversion
assumption. Being able to evaluate risk preferences over a range of different preferences
and drawing references from these depictions is a fundamental goal of this analysis.
Similar to SDRF, SERF allows for the ranking of multiple scenarios over different risk
preferences given a defined level of wealth.
4.2.5 Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function
SERF analyzes stochastic scenarios given a particular range of risk preferences
and wealth. Unlike SDRF which requires a specified risk aversion level, SERF allows
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for the ranking of multiple scenarios typically ranging from a neutral to extremely riskaverse range. Results can then be ranked according to the particular risk aversion class
(Richardson & Outlaw, 2008). Also, across the general classes of preferences summaries
may be drawn regarding the performance of the nine risk management scenarios.
The range of risk preferences ranked by the SERF analysis includes risk neutral
and slightly, normally, moderately, and extremely risk averse. These classes either rank
preferences in SERF according to RAC or Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients (ARAC).
The difference between the two coefficients involves the assumptions behind the levels of
wealth. RAC ranks preferences according to a relative or generalized level, whereas
ARAC accounts for the decision-maker’s level of wealth. In the case of the
representative farms, the level of wealth (assets) is estimated for ARAC values to use in
the SERF analysis.
Approximations for asset values on each of the eight representative farms come
from the average asset turnover ratio in Nebraska. This ratio comes from the weighted
summation of income and assets on farms with a gross farm income classification above
$100,000 in the USDA ERS ARMS Farm Financial and Crop Production Practices: Farm
Structure and Finance 2010-2011 data in Nebraska. These operations represent producers
in all eight NASS-ASDs (USDA Economic Research Service, 2011). Dividing these two
summed values equates to an average asset turnover rate of 25.23% in Nebraska during
the 2010 production year. Income and asset values during the 2010 production year
represent comparable economic forces as those expected in 2011 allowing for this value
to serve as a comparable approximation.
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Applying the average asset turnover ratio to each representative farm’s expected
gross income under the NP-NI-CM scenario generates estimated asset values reflecting
the size and scope of each operation. SERF analysis uses these estimates to establish a
level of wealth in calculating the ARAC values. To generate the ARAC values, the
constant relative RAC for each respective preference level was divided by the estimated
wealth level for each individual farm. The constant relative RAC values include 0 for
risk neutral and 0.5 for slightly, 1 for normally, 2 for moderately, and 4 for extremely risk
averse.
Based upon the range of ARAC values, the SERF procedure ranks the Certainty
Equivalents (CEs) for each scenario on the representative farm. A CE represents the sum
of wealth necessary to achieve a particular level of utility under a negative exponential
utility function. This equation takes into consideration a particular wealth and ARAC
value when estimating the utility achieved under a particular risk preference (Richardson
and Outlaw, 2008). The resulting SERF chart ranks each alternative risk management
scenario under the range of specified ARAC values. For a given ARAC level, the most
desired alterative is the one with highest CE value. The vertical difference between two
particular lines on a SERF chart represents the level of wealth that would need to be
added to the lower CE scenario to generate utility equal to the higher CE scenario.
As an example SERF chart, Figure 4.3 displays the nine alternative risk
management scenarios under a negative exponential utility function with ARAC values
ranging from 0 (risk neutral) to 0.0000009 (extremely risk averse) for the representative
farm of District 70. Refer to Appendix D containing Figures D.1 through D.8 for the
SERF charts involving each of the eight representative farms. Figure 4.3 shows the
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DCP-RP-FH (light blue line) alternative ranks as the optimal strategy across all ARAC
preferences. This scenario achieves the highest CE values under each ARAC position.
Next, the DCP-YP-FH scenario ranks second under this particular SERF analysis.
Scenarios do not rank the same across all risk preferences if one risk
management CE equation crosses another risk management CE equation. As an example
in Figure 4.3 when determining the third and fourth most desired outcomes, the utility
function for the DCP-RP-CM and ACRE-RP-FH cross approximately half-way through
the ARAC spectrum. For approximately the first half of the ARACs (less risk-averse) the
DCP-RP-CM ranks as the third most preferred, but when ACRE-RP-FH crosses above
this scenario the second alternative then has higher preferences (among more risk-averse
ARACs). The ability of different utility functions to cross in a SERF chart highlights that
a given optimal choice ranking is relative for a particular position on the ARAC
spectrum. Analysis of how the optimal choice varies across the range of RAC values can
still provide insight on the general performance of a particular scenario.
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Certainty Equivalent in Dollars

1,230,000
1,220,000
1,210,000
1,200,000
1,190,000
1,180,000
1,170,000
1,160,000
1,150,000
1,140,000
0

1

0.0000001 0.0000002 0.0000003 0.0000004 0.0000005 0.0000006 0.0000007 0.0000008 0.0000009
Alternative Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients
NP-NI-CM

DCP-RP-CM

DCP-RP-FH

DCP-YP-CM

ACRE-RP-CM

ACRE-RP-FH

ACRE-YP-CM

ACRE-YP-FH

DCP-YP-FH

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

Figure 4.3 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 70 for
Alternative Scenarios1
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Table 4.5 summarizes the eight figures of D.1 through D.8 in Appendix D
involving the SERF analyses of the eight representative farm simulation scenarios. Each
summary ranks the nine risk management scenarios for a given risk preference and
ARAC value. These rankings sorted the alternatives by assigning those with the highest
CE the greatest preference. The optimal choice and ranking of the scenarios varies
depending upon the preference and representative farm. CEs displayed with the negative
exponential utility functions cross periodically in analysis. When drawing an overall
summary of Table 4.5, a specific ARAC level must be defined or assumptions regarding
the crossing inverse utility functions have to be taken into consideration to define the
optimal set of strategies.
For individual risk preferences and associated ARAC levels, the SERF procedure
appropriately identifies the dominant strategy for each alternative choice. Trying to rank
the optimal strategy for each individual farm causes conflicting results due to crossing
CE lines in District 20 and 50. Only three cases involving these two representative farms
exist where the CE lines cross for the optimal choice. Assuming the most desired risk
management choice is the alternative which has the most number-one rankings across the
five ARAC levels in each farm analysis allows for identification of an optimal strategy.
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Table 4.5 Representative Farms Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function
(SERF) Summaries for Alternative Scenarios
Risk Management Scenarios

District 10 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

1

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
8
0.0000002
9
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
8
0.0000004
9
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
8
0.0000008
9
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
8
0.0000017
9
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
8

District 20 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
6
2
5
1
8
4
7
3
0.0000001
9
6
2
5
1
8
4
7
3
0.0000002
9
6
2
5
1
8
4
7
3
0.0000004
9
5
2
6
1
7
4
8
3
0.0000007
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4

District 30 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5
0.0000001
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5
0.0000002
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5
0.0000005
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4
0.0000010
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4

District 50 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
6
2
5
1
8
4
7
3
0.0000001
9
6
2
5
1
8
4
7
3
0.0000002
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4
0.0000004
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4
0.0000008
9
5
1
6
2
7
3
8
4

District 60 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000001
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000003
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000006
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5
0.0000011
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5

District 70 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000001
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000002
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000004
9
3
1
6
2
7
4
8
5
0.0000009
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5

District 80 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
3
1
4
2
7
5
8
6
0.0000001
9
3
1
4
2
7
5
8
6
0.0000002
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000004
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000009
9
4
1
6
2
7
3
8
5

District 90 Farm
Risk Preference
Neutral
Slightly
Normal
Moderately
Extremely
1
2

2

ARAC NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
0.0000000
9
3
1
4
2
7
5
8
6
0.0000001
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000003
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000005
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6
0.0000011
9
3
1
5
2
7
4
8
6

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
ARAC = Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient. Refer to Richardson and Outlaw (2009) for further discussion on ARAC.
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Observations drawn from Table 4.5 with the given assumptions and limitations
show the optimal choices include: DCP-RP-CM for District 10, DCP-YP-FH for District
20, and DCP-RP-FH for Districts 30 through 90. Once again not participating in any
government programs, crop insurance products, or marketing strategies represented by
the NP-NI-CM scenario provides the least desired alternative consistently across all
preferences and outcomes. Ranking of alternatives between the most- and least-desired
management scenarios shows mixed results.
Limitations and shortcomings posed by the EV, CV, SD, and StopLight analysis
procedures are overcome with the SERF methodology given certain assumptions and
limitations. SERF allows for the ranking of revenue distributions through the use of
expected values, variability of revenue, and different risk preferences. One single
methodology cannot provide the exclusive means to analyze simulation results without
shortcomings. SERF provided the most effective procedure given the scope of the
analysis, but drawing inferences from the previous four procedures is still valuable.
4.3 Summary of Results
Five different analysis procedures including EV, CV, SD, StopLight and SERF
were used to analyze the nine different simulation scenarios across the eight
representative farms. From the analysis, an optimal set of alternatives were identified
under each procedure. SD techniques either provided inconsistent techniques or did not
meet the needs of this analysis and their results are not included in the following
summary. Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 present the results from the four remaining
procedures utilized.
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4.3.1 Summary of Strategies
Table 4.6 presents the summary of the optimal scenarios involving the EV, CV,
StopLight, and SERF analysis. The optimal strategy for each farm under each analysis
procedure is denoted with the number one. Also, each scenario’s total is summed across
the eight representative farms in each analysis. These totals are then displayed in Figure
4.4 as a bar chart depiction.
At the most basic analysis level in Table 4.6, the EV procedure’s optimal choice
was the scenario producing the highest average expected gross farm revenue. Results
showed the highest EV by scenario and representative farm included: DCP-RP-CM for
District 10, DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 60, 70,
80, and 90. These results indicated that the alternatives involving the DCP as the
government program choice and RP as the crop insurance product had the greatest
preference for the representative farms. Another element of risk farms are concerned
about involves the variability of revenue, which the EV procedure does not take into
consideration when analyzing the alternative scenarios.
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Table 4.6 Summary of Preferred Stochastic Results for Representative Farms under
Alternative Scenarios
Expected Gross
1
Risk Management Scenarios
Farm Revenue (GFR)
Region
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm
1
District 20 Farm
1
District 30 Farm
1
District 50 Farm
1
District 60 Farm
1
District 70 Farm
1
District 80 Farm
1
District 90 Farm
1
Total
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
0
0
Coefficient of Variation (CV)
Region
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm
1
District 20 Farm
1
District 30 Farm
1
District 50 Farm
1
District 60 Farm
1
District 70 Farm
1
District 80 Farm
1
District 90 Farm
1
Total
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
StopLight Charts
Region
District 10 Farm
District 20 Farm
District 30 Farm
District 50 Farm
District 60 Farm
District 70 Farm
District 80 Farm
District 90 Farm
Total

NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
7
0
1
0
0
0
0

Stochastic Efficiency with Respects to a Function (SERF)
Region
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
District 10 Farm
1
District 20 Farm
1
District 30 Farm
1
District 50 Farm
1
District 60 Farm
1
District 70 Farm
1
District 80 Farm
1
District 90 Farm
1
Total
0
1
6
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

CV overcomes some of the limitations imposed by the EV analysis by combining
the mean and standard deviation of gross farm revenue. With this evaluation process, the
alternative showing the lowest CV provides the least relative revenue variability on a
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farm. The DCP-RP-FH alternative proved to be the optimal scenario across all farms for
the CV analysis as Table 4.6 summarizes. However the CV did not determine the
optimal choice on all of the representative farms to necessarily have the highest EV.
Under that analysis DCP-RP-CM in District 10 and DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50
provided the most desired results. These scenarios provided slightly higher anticipated
averages under the set of alternatives available by $3,668 in District 10, $488 in District
20, and $190 in District 50. Although negligible in value when compared to the overall
expected gross farm revenue, the results still present a fundamental difference between
the two methodologies.
Solely relying on the highest EV or lowest CV does not take into consideration
the probability of achieving a certain level of revenue. SD involves FSD, SDS, and
SDRF that allows for the ranking of stochastic distributions under various probability
levels and assumptions. Analysis of the CDF charts showed each representative farm’s
revenue distribution under one scenario overlaps multiple times with another alternative,
which eliminates the FSD and SDS methodologies from analyzing the revenue
distributions. SDRF could analyze the various scenarios, but requires a predefined RAC
level that only encompasses one particular risk aversion level.
Shortcomings introduced by EV, CV, or SD provided the motivation to consider
other analysis procedures. StopLight charts introduced a methodology to evaluate the
probability of achieving different levels of revenue involving a stochastic distribution.
Critical cut-off values established under this process represented estimated variable and
total crop production expenses. The optimal choice with this process involved the
outcome with the highest probability of covering total crop production expenses. Table
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4.6 indicates that the DCP-RP-FH served as the optimal strategy for all representative
farms except District 10 where the preferred alternative was DCP-YP-FH. Although
each individual can interpret each StopLight chart independently, the scope of the
analysis seeks to rank different risk management scenarios for a variety of risk
preferences.
Introduced as the final technique to analyze the nine stochastic scenarios, SERF
allowed for the ranking of different alternatives and risk preferences. Each farm had a
level of assets estimated to determine the ARACs necessary for the SERF analysis.
Preferences established from the ARACs ranged from risk neutral to extremely risk
averse. Under this procedure the optimal scenario was identified as the one with the
highest rank across all of the preferences. Under the SERF analysis, optimum scenarios
by the representative farms included: DCP-RP-CM for District 10, DCP-YP-FH in
District 20 and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 as shown in Table 4.6.
4.3.2 Implications for Nebraska
Individual farm-level stochastic analysis results presented in Table 4.6 were
compiled to draw overall summaries involving all of the procedures. From these results,
the bar chart in Figure 4.4 presents the optimal strategies given the EV, CV, StopLight
charts and SERF analysis. Definite trends may be observed from the overall performance
of these programs across the set of representative farms.
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8
7

Number of Farms

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Alternative Scenario
EV
1
2

CV

StopLight

SERF

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
GFR = Expected Gross Farm Revenue, CV = Coefficient of Variation, StopLight = StopLight
charts, and SERF = Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function

Figure 4.4 Bar Chart Depiction of Preferred Stochastic Results for Representative
Farms under Alternative Scenarios1
Overall, Figure 4.4 shows the DCP-RP-FH scenario provided the greatest number
of optimal outcomes across the four different stochastic analysis procedures and across
the eight representative farms. All representative farms were better off participating in a
scenario involving a government program and crop insurance product instead of the
NP-NI-CM alternative. One can ascertain from this result that participating in a
government program and purchasing a crop insurance policy increases and stabilizes
gross farm revenue to a degree. Several reasons may explain and suggest why
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participating in the various risk management strategies provides greater protection to a
representative farm’s revenue.
As part of the Farm Bill through the end of the 2012 crop production year,
producers may choose to either participate in DCP or ACRE. Either of these programs
have DPs, which distributes direct monetary payments based upon historical base acres
and yields. DPs under ACRE are at a reduced rate, but in either case monetary payments
received by the operations are a guaranteed source of income subject to FSA compliance
requirements. Implications for crop producers are that participation in DCP or ACRE is
beneficial to their gross farm revenue.
Another observation from Figure 4.4 shows participation in scenarios involving
DCP are more desired over the ACRE alternative for the representative farms. The
performance of these programs is influenced greatly by the yield and price distributions
simulated in the model. Price and yield expectations during the 2011 production year are
considerably higher than guarantees or price support levels established under the ACRE
and DCPs. While ACRE had guarantees closer to price expectations of 2011 when
compared to the DCP supports, the risk reduction effects gained with this program do not
exceed the reduction in DPs. Recommendations drawn on this analysis regarding current
government program options suggest the DCP program outperforms ACRE under current
price and yield expectations and variability levels expressed in the representative farm
model. Commodity programs provided through the USDA FSA beyond 2012 remain
unknown, but serve as an area for future research.
Figure 4.4 shows that beside the most preferable scenario of DCP-RP-FH, the
DCP-YP-FH and DCP-RP-CM alternatives are the second and third most desirable
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outcomes but were far behind. Representative farms in Districts 30, 60, 70, 80, and 90
had results consistently picking the DCP-RP-FH scenario as the optimal outcome. The
only difference for the representative farms in Districts 20 and 50 selecting the
DCP-YP-FH scenario as the most preferred scenario relates to the crop insurance choice
of RP versus YP in the risk management strategy. Also, the optimal outcome
DCP-RP-CM for District 10 differs from the DCP-RP-FH by using a CM strategy instead
of a FH. This summary shows that the representative farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50 act
as the outliers in the analysis.
Differences between the expected gross farm revenue of the DCP-RP-FH scenario
and optimal strategies identified in Districts 10, 20, and 50’s representative farms amount
to $3,668, $488, and $190. In relative comparison to the expected gross farm revenue,
these amounts are small and insignificant. Still, evaluating the difference in marketing
strategies or crop insurance products provides some explanation. Underlying acreage
distributions and yield expectations across the three farms lead to the differences in
performance of these strategies.
NASS-ASDs 10, 20, and 50 lie in the western, north central, and central regions
of Nebraska. The representative farm in District 10 has unique cropland acres in
comparison to the other eight operations. Similar to other representative farms in size,
District 10’s representative farm has approximately 30 and 70 percent of the cropland
acres in corn and winter wheat respectively. District 20’s representative farm has a
cropland acreage distribution of 65, 24, and 11 percent involving irrigated corn, irrigated
soybeans, and dryland corn respectively. Also, the representative farm in District 50
follows a similar distribution where 71, 18, and 11 percent of the land is in irrigated corn,
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irrigated soybeans, and dryland corn once again. The location of these representative
farm districts and distribution of total cropland acres varies from the five other farms.
The representative farm in District 10 with a negative FH gain under the
DCP-RP-FH scenario leads to stronger performance of CM with the DCP-RP-CM
alternative. Evaluation of the base planting-time average futures price versus harvesttime average futures price shows on average the winter wheat contract ends higher for
hard red winter wheat, but only slightly lower for corn. These differences show the
futures hedge loss and gain for the two crops raised on the representative farm partially
offset each other, but in net end up with a loss. Several reasons may lead to the notably
higher average hard red winter wheat futures harvest price. Contract performance,
liquidity, and the number of market participants may influence the historical price
deviations and ultimately lead to the higher harvest-time prices.
Finally, YP under the DCP-YP-FH strategy outperforms RP in the DCP-RP-FH
alternative on the representative farms in Districts 20 and 50. In each case either
representative farm has about 90% of the total cropland acres irrigated. Assuming the
crop insurance premium rates are actuarially fair, representative farms should prefer the
RP crop insurance policy due to the rate of government subsidization and methodology
used to calibrate farm-level yield variability.
RP and YP crop insurance have subsidization rates at levels greater than 50
percent of the policy. Assuming farm-level yield deviations are calibrated appropriately,
producers should choose the product providing the greatest level of protection being RP.
YP only provides protection to yield losses, whereas RP covers both yield and price risk
which encompasses both systemic and idiosyncratic elements. The relatively small
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differences in expected revenue between the two scenarios show a producer would be just
about as well off to participate in the DCP-RP-FH. Also, since both farms encompass
predominately irrigated practices, this leads to lower yield risk, but little protection from
systemic price shocks. A risk-averse operation would prefer the greater level of
protection with the DCP-RP-FH instead of the DCP-YP-FH.
In summary, the DCP-RP-FH strategy serves as the dominant strategy across the
majority of representative farms given price and yield expectations of 2011. Simulation
procedures utilized to evaluate the results included: EV, CV, SD, StopLight, and SERF.
These procedures did show that the optimal strategy did not carry through to all of the
procedures for representative farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50. Differences were
negligible in comparison to overall farm revenue. Unique yield and price parameters of
these farms may have led to the differences.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Summaries drawn from the stochastic simulation assist producers with decision
making involving crop production across Nebraska. As risk management tools progress
over time, so will the strategies employed by producers. This progression creates the
need for further research. The scope of this analysis focused on evaluating risk
management strategies encompassing government programs, crop insurance products,
and marketing strategies for the 2011 production year.
5.1 Conclusions and Implications
The following section summarizes major contributions and results found by the
research proceedings. Initial motivations (Chapter 1) focused the direction of the
literature review (Chapter 2). These references provided the foundation to design the
correlated model for simulating alternative risk management strategies (Chapter 3).
Analysis procedures involving EV, CV, SD, StopLight charts, and SERF allowed for
ranking of the stochastic results (Chapter 4) across different representative farms to
obtain conclusions regarding the performance of these strategies. Implications may be
drawn for producer-level decision making across Nebraska. Although focused to a
specific set of tools and yield and price expectations related to the 2011 production year,
results provide insight on risk management strategies and decision making. The results
also suggest areas for future research and policy discussions.
5.1.1 Motivation and Objectives
As a leader in the agricultural industry, farmers in Nebraska face unique farmspecific (idiosyncratic) and wide-spread (systemic) risk elements influencing crop yields
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and correlated prices. Also, Chapter 1 identified relevant government programs, crop
insurance products, and marketing strategies available to producers to deal with adverse
declines in crop revenue. Combining underlying risk elements with available
management tools provided the motivation for the research. The goal and scope of the
analysis was to design a correlated model which would represent the scale and diversity
of crop producers across the state and stochastically simulate crop revenue distributions
with related programs or products. From the set of risk management strategies and
representative farms depicted in the model, conclusions were drawn regarding the
performance of these programs across regions of different variability in Nebraska.
5.1.2 Review of Literature and Model
To accomplish the report’s objectives, literature reviewed in Chapter 2 provided
insight on risk management tools available for crop production along with direction on
previous research involving farm-level modeling in Nebraska. Risk management tools
fall into the classification of government programs, crop insurance products, or marketing
strategies. The 2008 Farm Bill reauthorized traditional income support programs like
ML, DP, and CCP tied to price. ACRE was also introduced in the 2008 legislation and
ties support to crop revenue guarantees. At the producer level, operations must decide
whether to participate in CCP or ACRE, but receive a reduced DP rate when selecting
ACRE.
Crop insurance administered by the USDA-RMA includes YP, RP, and RP-HPE.
These programs base guarantees off either yield or revenue involving an APH yield and
planting- or harvest-time average futures prices. A variety of marketing strategies exist
by using futures or option contracts traded on public exchanges for protection against
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declines in commodity prices. At the most basic level hedging with futures or options are
feasible alternatives to cash marketing for producers. The interactions of the various
tools are not mutually exclusive as literature cites the scope of protection that guards
against price, revenue, or production risk at the farm, area, or national level.
A review of previous studies shows substantial evaluation of individual
components of the risk management portfolio at the producer level, but not an evaluation
of a cohesive combination of the tools. These studies did however provide insight on the
performance and shortcomings of each individual tool across a variety of production
conditions. One conclusion apparent from the research shows models used to evaluate
the tools have not focused on farm-level decision-making across Nebraska. These
models, either at a sector or farm level, established a baseline from which to build the
representative farm model of Nebraska agriculture.
To design the representative farm model of Nebraska crop production, various
yield and price parameters were necessary to simulate risk management tools and
determine revenue distributions. Chapter 3 reviewed the differences in size, cropping
pattern, and productivity factors across different regions of Nebraska. Differences in
cropping practices across Nebraska correlate well with acreage and yield data of the
NASS-ASDs. These regions subdivide Nebraska’s 93 counties into eight areas. Based
upon the scope of the analysis, one representative farm was formulated for each NASSASD where the size, cropping patterns, irrigation practices, and yield history reflect the
average attributes of those found across counties lying in the region.
Yields simulated in the model included those at the national, state, district,
county, and farm level. Also, simulated prices reflect the deviation between the planting-
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and harvest-time average futures price. To adjust for national or state MYA cash prices,
a fixed basis was added to the simulated harvest-time prices. Prices and yields in the
model were correlated. Using time-adjusted deviations from trend for key variables, the
system of equations allowed for observed correlations to be maintained and modeled
directly.
A correlation matrix involving national- and state-level variables served as the
base for the simulation. DAG procedures were used to analyze district yield deviations
and regress yields off relevant state and district yields by cropping practice. County
yields were directly regressed off the simulated district yields. Finally, a stochastic
component using Miranda’s formula was added to the county yields to reflect average
farm-level variability expressed in the representative county for each NASS-ASD.
Through the base correlation matrix and series of regression equations, the representative
farm model carried correlations through each level of aggregation.
5.1.3 Summary of Strategies and Results
Previous literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identified the set of risk tools relevant to
producers across Nebraska. Besides introducing the simulation procedure, Chapter 3
summarized the formation of the different strategies utilized in the different scenarios of
the model. The first scenario acts as the base strategy where each representative farm
cash markets all grains produced at the simulated MYA price and does not participate in
farm programs or crop insurance. Four of the remaining scenarios utilized DCP while the
other four selected ACRE as the government program choice. Logically producers will
participate in one of these two programs since these tools do not cost anything (not
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counting program limits or participation costs) and provide guaranteed revenue through
the DP.
Historical data showed two of the most popular crop insurance choices included
RP and YP at the seventy-percent protection level. Also, when coupling a novel hedge
with crop insurance producers typically do not pre-price more than the APH guarantee.
Combining the crop insurance and marketing strategies with the two government
program choices led to a total of eight risk management strategies along with the base
alternative not utilizing any of the various tools. Table 3.3 summarized these nine
scenarios. After the formulation of these strategies, each scenario was simulated 500
times with the same yield and price draws.
Chapter 4 analyzed these results with the EV, CV, SD, StopLight, and SERF
procedures. Each procedure had various advantages and disadvantages. At the most the
basic level the EV showed DCP-RP-CM was the optimal strategy for the representative
farm in District 10, DCP-YP-FH in Districts 20 and 50, and DCP-RP-FH in Districts 30,
60, 70, 80, and 90. One shortcoming of the EV technique was the inability to analyze the
variability of the crop revenue. CV took into consideration the variability of crop
revenue in the analysis. The CV technique found the DCP-RP-FH alternative was the
optimal choice across all representative farms for an operation seeking the lowest level of
relative variability in crop revenue.
Review of the CDF charts of each representative farm found that the SD would
not provide consistent results or improve upon the EV or CV techniques. Also, CDF
charts showed most of the revenue distributions had a significant amount of overlap.
StopLight charts improved on CV by taking into consideration not only the variability of
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the representative farms’ revenue, but also the probability of achieving a certain level of
revenue. These levels can relate to producer risk preferences.
Benchmarks estimated with StopLight charts relate to the probability of being
able to cover estimated variable and total costs related to crop production. The optimal
choice under this technique was the strategy which had the highest probability of
covering total estimated expenses. All of the representative farms except for District 50
had DCP-RP-FH as the optimal strategy. Once again, DCP-YP-FH was the most
preferred scenario for the representative farm in district 50. Besides the EV procedure
assuming a risk-neutral producer attitude, all of the previous techniques assumed riskaverse preferences when determining the optimal strategy.
SERF introduced the methodology to rank the performance of the risk
management strategy across a variety of risk preferences ranging from neutral to
extremely risk-averse. Ranking the procedures to determine the optimal outcome showed
DCP-RP-FH was the preferred alternative for the representative farms in most districts.
In Districts 10 and 20, DCP-RP-CM and DCP-YP-FH were the optimal strategies
respectfully. Definite trends developed regarding the performance of the nine
alternatives as the DCP-RP-FH alternative served as the most common choice, although
outlier cases did exist.
5.1.4 Implications for Producers on Management Decisions
Simulated risk management strategies reflected the alternatives available during
the 2011 production year. Yield and price expectations along with tools available in the
future will change. However, these results do provide insight for the upcoming
production years and producer decision making. Overall, except for the representative
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farms in Districts 10, 20, and 50, the optimal scenario was DCP-RP-FH. The results in
these three districts are not consistent with the overall set, but producers in these areas
would still choose participation in a government program involving DCP over ACRE.
Implications for Nebraska crop producers point to participation in DCP, RP, and
FH as carrying the greatest benefits for reducing negative crop revenue variability.
Regions in the western and central portions of Nebraska have unique yield and crop
rotation attributes that may influence the performance of these various tools. DCP
outperforms ACRE due to current price and yield levels in comparison to program
support levels. Both programs would trigger support payments far below current
expected price and yield levels. While support payments are not expected, the
guaranteed DP with DCP are higher than those under ACRE. Also, assuming crop
insurance rates are actuarially fair, producers should consider purchasing these products
due to current subsidy levels. Finally, FH versus only CM of the crop shows farm-level
crop revenue experiences less variability by using futures. This may also lead to
producers experiencing margin calls in rapid upswings of prices.
5.2 Areas of Future Research
Simulation results reflected the relevant combinations of government programs,
crop insurance products, and marketing strategies available during the 2011 production
year with correlated yield and price expectations. These three broad categories will likely
remain relevant to risk management strategies utilized by producers across Nebraska in
the future. Individual tools within these categories will probably evolve and progress
over time to satisfy economic and production conditions of the period. Future research
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should focus on improving the performance of these products to better aid producers in
dealing with declines in crop revenue.
5.2.1 Future Production Years
Each production year, the set of risk management strategies should be
reformulated to reflect available tools and simulated under current yield and price
expectations. The base yield and price parameters of each production year’s simulation
may have a significant influence on the performance of various strategies. Identifying
these unique production attributes will be important for future producers in certain
regions of the state to make good decisions. Also, expanding the number of
representative farms across Nebraska in the model would provide additional value to
producers with more operations available for comparison.
Creating a producer-based decision interface which links to the representative
farm model could aid producers in evaluating their individual risk management strategies.
An interface that allows producers to input historical yields, parameters necessary for the
various tools, and risk management strategies could be linked with the correlated model
and produce simulation results reflecting actual farms. Also, that process would carry
through the respective correlations previously identified at larger yield or price
aggregation levels to the individual producer’s operation.
5.2.2 2012 Farm Bill Proposals and Beyond
Government farm program choices involving ACRE and DCP will only remain
available through the 2012 production year. Different interest groups and commodity
organizations have proposed various farm program alternatives during the national debt
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resolution debate of 2011 and the development of the 2012 Farm Bill. Many of these
program proposals would create a crop revenue safety net similar to ACRE, but without
any DP or a state-wide trigger. Some other proposals would still utilize a price support
guarantee (Shields & Schnepf, 2011). In either case, the design of the representative
farm model can easily allow for the evaluation of these various revenue or price safety
net proposals. Simulation results provide insight on the design and resulting performance
of government programs.
5.2.3 Future Crop Insurance Policies
The role of crop insurance across Nebraska has evolved over time with the rise in
commodity prices and increase in expected yields. Also, depending upon the design of
future farm programs, the relevance of crop insurance may increase even more. Within
each crop insurance policy are various levels of coverage. Evaluating different strategies
involving different levels of coverage may identify better combinations of the various
tools. Refinements to these products will also likely develop in the future. As a pilot
program during the 2012 production year, producers have the option to trend adjust their
APH yields due to an average increase in the productivity of the major crops (USDA
Risk Management Agency, 2011c). This pilot program serves as an example of another
relevant study to perform and analyze across the set of representative farms.
5.2.4 Marketing Decisions
A multitude of marketing strategies exist involving futures, options, forward
contracts, and cash sales. Opportunities exist to study various combinations across the
set of representative farms and interactions with other programs or products.
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Understanding the motivation behind the placement and timing of marketing strategies
poses another interesting question. Also, developing a price set to reflect basis specific to
a certain region of Nebraska during different periods of the marketing season would add
further insight on marketing decisions across the state.
5.3 Summary
Variability and productivity factors of Nebraska lead to unique farm-specific as
well as wide-spread risk elements. Risk management tools available to producers include
government programs, crop insurance products, and marketing strategies. Previous
research did not completely define, combine, and simulate an appropriate set of risk
management strategies relevant to different regions of Nebraska. Results from this
research of defined risk management strategies show selecting DCP as the government
program choice, with a 70% RP crop insurance policy, and hedging 70% of the expected
production provides the greatest benefit for the majority representative farms during the
2011 production year.
Results from the simulation provide direction for future research. Increasing the
number of representative farms in the model or creating a user-based interface would
allow producers to base decisions off more specific simulation results. Proposals for
farm programs beyond 2012 should be evaluated on the representative farm model to
provide direction with policy development. Pilot crop insurance programs may be
another area to evaluate along with a multitude of marketing strategies. All three of these
risk management tools provide areas for further evaluation as policy and economic
conditions evolve.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Reference Tables
Table A.1 Representative Farm Simulation Summary Statistics for Alternative
Scenarios
District 10
1
Farm
Risk Management Scenarios
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
604,574.20 644,894.21 641,226.06 643,533.15 639,865.00
640,624.49
636,956.34
639,263.43
635,595.29
StDev
160,866.02 133,579.07 127,017.63 137,026.24 130,387.63
133,467.39
126,961.85
136,895.14
130,309.95
CV
26.61
20.71
19.81
21.29
20.38
20.83
19.93
21.41
20.50
Min
68,516.84 406,772.62 394,831.70 382,369.98 386,203.54
402,341.69
390,400.77
377,939.05
381,772.61
Max
1,048,753.81 1,062,383.08 988,425.65 1,065,125.55 991,168.12 1,057,952.15
983,994.71 1,060,694.62
986,737.18
District 20 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
1,359,031.26 1,401,590.34 1,411,523.92 1,402,078.55 1,412,012.14 1,395,248.26 1,405,181.84 1,395,736.47 1,405,670.06
StDev
297,567.91 267,779.44 246,992.43 272,534.87 251,504.61
267,750.53
246,961.28
272,506.38
251,473.92
CV
21.90
19.11
17.50
19.44
17.81
19.19
17.58
19.52
17.89
Min
464,913.79 902,414.03 893,880.09 824,266.49 884,746.21
896,050.28
887,516.34
817,902.74
878,382.46
Max
2,129,762.99 2,146,513.45 1,955,441.38 2,151,003.64 1,959,931.57 2,140,149.70 1,949,077.63 2,144,639.89 1,953,567.82
District 30 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
1,007,462.83 1,032,496.72 1,036,303.04 1,031,480.02 1,035,286.34 1,028,682.18 1,032,488.49 1,027,665.48 1,031,471.79
StDev
176,336.44 164,773.97 149,036.96 167,245.37 151,016.14
164,639.73
148,901.38
167,108.79
150,877.55
CV
17.50
15.96
14.38
16.21
14.59
16.00
14.42
16.26
14.63
Min
491,627.03 655,714.24 677,650.01 620,167.19 676,267.34
651,830.44
673,766.21
616,283.39
672,383.54
Max
1,586,734.77 1,599,230.52 1,456,417.64 1,600,584.97 1,457,772.09 1,595,346.72 1,452,533.84 1,596,701.18 1,453,888.30
District 50 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
1,190,801.24 1,229,694.55 1,239,896.15 1,229,884.30 1,240,085.90 1,224,141.90 1,234,343.50 1,224,331.65 1,234,533.25
StDev
267,607.89 237,471.20 221,886.96 243,039.86 226,792.31
237,439.74
221,852.61
243,009.40
226,759.01
CV
22.47
19.31
17.90
19.76
18.29
19.40
17.97
19.85
18.37
Min
300,478.85 773,731.97 771,073.42 683,532.78 729,992.31
768,153.41
765,494.86
677,954.22
724,413.75
Max
1,746,749.47 1,804,378.49 1,655,036.96 1,800,512.00 1,659,479.42 1,798,799.93 1,649,458.40 1,794,933.44 1,653,900.86
District 60 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
900,449.03 935,832.61 939,096.12 933,758.48 937,021.99
931,514.74
934,778.25
929,440.60
932,704.12
StDev
155,902.96 138,566.56 124,525.43 142,237.35 127,234.48
138,509.05
124,456.29
142,179.68
127,164.98
CV
17.31
14.81
13.26
15.23
13.58
14.87
13.31
15.30
13.63
Min
501,945.98 656,542.69 649,949.42 567,290.26 635,955.01
652,169.59
645,576.32
562,917.17
631,581.91
Max
1,389,554.77 1,404,953.64 1,347,471.56 1,406,797.04 1,349,314.96 1,399,513.68 1,342,031.60 1,401,357.09 1,343,875.01
District 70 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
1,175,720.85 1,232,240.98 1,238,017.77 1,230,367.25 1,236,144.04 1,225,558.87 1,231,335.66 1,223,685.14 1,229,461.93
StDev
255,731.14 218,403.78 208,294.37 225,282.68 214,151.98
218,346.15
208,265.99
225,224.23
214,121.67
CV
21.75
17.72
16.82
18.31
17.32
17.82
16.91
18.41
17.42
Min
350,181.69 831,422.99 823,311.36 722,593.65 749,740.96
824,592.41
816,480.78
715,763.08
742,910.38
Max
1,842,281.21 1,860,427.75 1,749,523.53 1,865,040.18 1,754,135.96 1,853,597.17 1,742,692.95 1,858,209.60 1,747,305.38
District 80 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
1,136,409.57 1,172,855.88 1,177,523.96 1,172,099.30 1,176,767.38 1,167,120.24 1,171,788.31 1,166,363.65 1,171,031.73
StDev
190,419.26 173,980.89 158,577.09 177,595.53 161,552.23
173,947.44
158,557.42
177,562.93
161,533.11
CV
16.76
14.83
13.47
15.15
13.73
14.90
13.53
15.22
13.79
Min
589,762.08 775,717.32 795,179.11 665,343.20 795,235.96
769,925.48
789,387.27
659,551.36
789,444.12
Max
1,712,964.67 1,735,290.14 1,575,314.40 1,737,462.71 1,577,486.98 1,729,498.29 1,569,522.56 1,731,670.87 1,571,695.13
District 90 Farm
Variable
NP-NI-CM DCP-RP-CM DCP-RP-FH DCP-YP-CM DCP-YP-FH ACRE-RP-CM ACRE-RP-FH ACRE-YP-CM ACRE-YP-FH
Mean
946,216.15 988,837.68 991,511.49 986,874.59 989,548.40
984,143.49
986,817.30
982,180.40
984,854.21
StDev
171,326.46 150,511.96 139,801.61 153,323.40 141,956.85
150,452.28
139,743.81
153,262.01
141,896.91
CV
18.11
15.22
14.10
15.54
14.35
15.29
14.16
15.60
14.41
Min
399,432.37 642,955.23 662,057.97 630,413.36 649,516.10
638,162.31
657,265.05
625,620.44
644,723.18
Max
1,473,128.17 1,488,633.63 1,447,130.91 1,490,513.38 1,449,010.66 1,483,840.71 1,442,337.99 1,485,720.47 1,444,217.74
1

Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure B.1 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 10 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Figure B.2 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 20 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Figure B.3 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 30 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure B.4 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 50 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure B.5 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 60 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure B.6 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 70 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure B.7 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 80 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

108

Figure B.8 Gross Farm Revenue Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Approximations in District 90 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.1 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 10 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.2 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 20 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.3 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 30 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.4 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 50 for Alternative Scenarios

Lower Cut-Off Value 311,692
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.5 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 60 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.6 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 70 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
1
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Figure C.7 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 80 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
P(U) = Probability of Unfavorable Event
P(C) = Probability of Cautionary Event
P(F) = Probability of Favorable Event
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Figure C.8 Gross Farm Revenue StopLight Chart in District 90 for Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.

Figure D.1 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) in District 10 for
1
Alternative Scenarios

Appendix D Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Charts
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.2 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 20 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.3 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 30 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.4 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 50 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.5 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 60 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.6 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 70 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.7 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 80 for
1
Alternative Scenarios
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Refer to Table 3.3 for a description on simulation scenarios and abbreviations.
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Figure D.8 Gross Farm Revenue Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) Analysis in District 90 for
1
Alternative Scenarios

